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The  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation hereby  submits to the 
European  Parliament  the following motion  for  a  resolution,  together with 
explanatory  statement: 
MOTION  FOR  A RESOLUTION 
on  trade relations between  the  European  Community  and  the countries of the 
African continent 
The  European  Parliament, 
- having regard  to the report of the Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation 
and  the opinions of the Committee  on  External  Economic  Relations  and  the 
Political Affairs Committee  (Doc.  47/77), 
1.  Sees  the Lome  Convention  as  an  important  component  of the Community's 
development  policy  inasmuch as it may  be  described  as  a  genuine develop-
ment  contract in  favour  of the  ACP  countries,  which has  introduced  a 
new  and  decisive note  into international development  policy,  particularly 
by the  inclusion of  such  important  elements  as  industrial  ~ooperation, 
the  stabilization of export  revenues  and  guarantees on  prices  and 
quantities for  sugar-producing countries; 
2.  Recalls the  important part played by the Yaounde  Convention  in developing 
the Community's  rel~tions with Africa  and  emphasizes the  importance  in 
this connection of the Lome  Convention as the  logical  and  intensified 
continuation of this policy; 
3.  Takes the view that because  of the  former  colonial relationships of 
some  of its Member  States  and  the resulting close trade  and  cultural 
links with Africa,  the Member  States of the Community  also bear  a 
special responsibility vis-a-vis this continent; 
4.  Calls  upon  the  community,  nevertheless,  to integrate its African  policy 
into its overall  development  policy; 
5.  Welcomes  the cooperation  agreements between the  EEC  and  the Maghreb 
States as  an  important  step forward  and  a  decisive breakthrough in the 
EEC's  policy towards  Africa; 
6.  Emphasizes  in this connection the economic  and  political importance 
of the cooperation  agreements with the Mashrek countries which  are 
an  essential part of this policy and  hopes that these agreements will 
stimulate the  Euro-Arab  dialogue; 
- 5  - PE  45.547/fin. . 7.  Points  out  to the  ~inance Ministers,  who  are simultaneously 
Governors  of  the  ~uropean ltlvestment  Bank,  that,  having  regard to 
the  financial obligations of  the  Maghreb  and  Mashrek  agreements, 
the  funds  of the  European  Investment  Bank  must,. where  necessary, 
be  increased  so that this policy - which  is regarded  as  necessary  -
need  not be  financed  from  the  financial  aid which  is  intended  for 
structurally weak  areas  in the  EEC  Member  States; 
8.  Regards  it as  essential that,  as  the process  of economic  cooperation is 
intensified,  suitable measures  should be  taken to protect private  and 
public  undertakings  against political risks  and  considers it important 
that profits should be  reinvested  in  the  countries  concerned; 
9.  Attaches  great  importance to the  Euro-Arab  dialogue  as  a  means  of 
facilitating political and  economic  cooperation between both  groups 
and  of  promoting  international  trade relations; 
10. Notes  that  South Africa's  role as  a  potentially important  trading partner 
of neighbouring African states and  of the  Community  is hindered by its 
fatal  policy  of  apartheid,  and  asks  the  Community  and  the  Governments  of 
the  Member  States  to  seek,  if necessary together with  the  Governments 
in Africa with which  the  Community  maintains  special relations,  possible 
ways  of putting an  end to the  policy of apartheid  and  ultimately make 
possible  a  political system which guarantees civil rights  and  in which 
all citizens can  participate without  discrimination; 
11.  Calls  for  the  independence of  Namibia  at the earliest possible date  and 
for  the  establishment of  a  government which has the  support  of the majority 
of the population,  thus making it possible  for this country on  gaining 
its independence to accede to the  Lome  Convention by means  of  a  simpli-
fied  procedure; 
12.  Also  declares its support  for  the  independence  of  Rhodesia  and  the 
establishment  of  a  government  which  has the  support  of the majority 
of the  population,  which would  make  it possible for this country also 
to accede,  at  a  later date,  to the Lome  Convention; 
13. Regards  it as  particularly important that ACP  countries which  suffer 
economically  as  a  result of political events  in Southern Africa  should 
receive  special  aid  from  the  Community; 
14. Regards  the Declaration adopted by the  EEC  Foreign Ministers  on  23 
February 1976  as  the first practical step  towards  a  common  policy 
on  the  problems  in Southern Africa; 
- 6  - PE  45.547/fin. 15.  Urges  the  Community,  in the  interest of  the African countries which 
maintain special relations with  the  Community by virtue of the  Lome 
Convention  and  also with  a  view  to  promoting  normal  trading relations, 
to  pursue  an  active trade  policy that can make  a  positive and effective 
contribution to  the  settlement of the  grave  problems  in  Southern 
Africa; 
16.  Condemns all foreign  military intervention and  all supplies of arms  to  the 
Southern  African crisis  area  and  declares its sole  and  exclusive 
support  for  political solutions to existing  conflicts·~ 
17.  Endorses  the  position hitherto taken by the Organization of African 
Unity with  a  view  to promoting African cooperation,  and  consequently 
instructs its President to  forward  this resolution to  the  OAU; 
18.  Instructs its President to  forward  this resolution  and  the report of 
its committee to the Council  and  Commission  of the European Communities. 
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1..  In  .recent  years  vP.ry  import<mt  chu.nges  have  taken  plucc  ut:  international 
l<)Vcl  .in  the  relationship between  North  and  South,  that  i.R,  ])etween  the 
indus trial  i.zetl  nr~tions  arH:l  the  developing  countries.  'l'hese  changes  have 
been  very  r;:~pid  and  thP.  effectB  have  been  both  economic  und political.  For 
the  fi.rat  time  i.n  history  t:he  international system has  become  a  truly world-
wide  system,  since  the  Third  Worl<~ bloc is  now  a  powerful  force  in world 
politics.  The  role  of the  developing countries  .i.n  world politics is no 
longer  pas:;ive  but  active.  The  latest development  is characterized by 
growing  sel£-av1areness  of the  Thil·d  World,  the  latent and  persistent danger 
of  a  confrontation between  North  and  South,  the  slowly  receding world  econo-
mic  crisis  ~md above  all by  the  recognition that  the  individuul  factors  in 
the  world  economy  are  much  more  closely related,  and  economic  i~terdependence 
is  much  greate-r,  than was· previously. assumed. 
2.  With  unprecedented solidarity,  the  Third  tvorld  countries are pursuing 
their  aim  of  following  up  political independence with  economic  independence. 
Development  policy  is  therefore  not  a  technical subject  confin~d to special-
istn but  a  matter  of vital political  importunce.  The  central  feature  of 
the  developing  countries'  list of demands  is  the  creation  of  a  new  world 
economic  order.  1\lthough  not  just  the  industrialized countries  ~1ere en-
abled  to  expand  th0ir  t.rade  and  production  under  the  economic order of the 
post-war period,  the  difference  in  per  capita  income  bet.wec:n  the  r.i.ch  and 
poor  countries has  visibly  increased.  'l'he  average  growth  rate  of  5.  7% 
acl1ieved  in  ~1e developing  countries  conceals  the  fact  that  the  poorest  of 
them  often  h.:tve  a  very  much  lov1er  rate  of gro\ith.  We  have  come  closer  to 
the  develop111ent  objective,  but it hds  not been  reached  under  the  cxinting 
economic  system.  'l'hl~  present w"orld  ~conomic system is  therefore  i.n  urgent 
need  of  correction  since  the oil crisis,  the  food  deficit,  the  fertilizer 
crisi.'l,  the  balance  of  tr:ilde  deficits,  inflation,  recession  and  unemploJ·1nent 
nre  symptoms  of an  i.mb.< l.un<.:e  which  are  no  longer  tolerable  to this de<Jree. 
3.  A  ruc'lical  change  in  the  existing world  economic  order -w·ould  not, 
howover,  oolve  the  pn~va  iling  probl2tn.<a, but  lP.ad  to appreciable  current 
account deficits  to  the  detriment  of all concerned.  TI1e  necessary re-
structuring  cun  only result  from  carefully  plann~;d  and  long  ovel·due  rc~fonus 
in  the  relationship between  No~th 0nd  South;  a  satisfactory solution will 
only be  hroug11t.  about  l..ly  a  conRtaut  and  evolt~ti.onary apprn<Jch.  The  in-
dustr.falized  n.-1tionn  and  t11c  d<cvclopin~r counlr.iea  rnu3t  aqr10e  on  ..:1  nc•.v  wor:ld 
orde_r  bargain  to  e~voiLl  a  si.tuilt:ion  .in  which  one  :>ide  tuakr~s  <>xtrava'J'~nt 
- 8  - PE  45.547/fin. in·lu::tri.:l]i·~··,l  IJ.tl.i•··n~l  1111:::1  JJ,,.r,·t<>t<·  ,·,jJ,il•r>t.l:,.  i11  r·J'c•rll·.lL\•1  :1  ~J•Jllci  ··l··l,•t 
Villir:il  I'[IL:ulnl''"'~"'~J  ctll  n;\(·i_clll~:  ulld  llll'  pr•>l.d.(·llli!  (.If  int.vrd•:']H.'l\'1"11< I'  (\r.1  \~··II  ,,,, 
cH·  <tt  .lt·'CJP.t  ;o  r<::l1•.1ctiun  .in  the  oxistin~r cwp,  in  ur<Jcntly  llCCdL·d.  I  [  U1e 
c-m~l1  numh~r ,,r  rich  cou!·!lri·'s  were  to practice  gi:ec..t~~J:  econoir.ic  justice 
in  thc.'ir:  d~<.!lJ.:l•J:·;  \,•itlt  the  lC<i.''JC  nmul,:•:r:  of poor  c·o;•ntries,  t.hn  l'e:•:ult  ''10\lld 
uncJcubl.cr'lly _l•u  ,.,  .r::ise  in  prorlucb.vity  i.n  the  developing  countrioos,  :i.ncron;.:nd 
inc:o:;ntive  to  ""Yt:k,  j_n1provcr~  b:od() .:::elaUo:;s  ancl,  fitv:J.lly,  bE,n<3f·i.1:~:  for  lhe  v.'hol.c 
"'urJ.;J  c•c..:cnom:,·  0\llc'l  thus  a  r0duc·tion  )r,  exis·ting  t.en~;:icJr.s.  Wii:h  the  aid  of<< 
pract..ic?.l  and  !K,thudical  policy  v•ayB  u.nd  r.1eans  mqst  thc:.refore  hr.·  foui1d  f.o~:  <<:-:!'>:ic;'Vinll 
a  l'><.tlu.nce  of int0rests  in  trl(,'  spirit pf  intorclep:~n,1err  .. :.::·.  FbDII3  Df  c:JOJ.Y..'t'i'lt:ion  n11st  h:~ 
dr.vclopecl  - as  already  emlJocli r-~d  to  some  extent in  the  Lom6  CcmvenLion  -·  \·Jhj ch 
wil.l  cr~·atc  .:1  w->cful  aJJd  pen:~nnent bulance  of intc·cests  l.•etween  the  poor  Ftnd 
rich  countricD  <~n<l 
bas  .i.e  nt~cods.  'f"ni::  J·,ali-ll!C<C  of  intf:n:~'ll!!:  •11ill  he  acl1ieved  nnt  by  a  confrn111.a-· 
tion  of  oppor;.ili<J  intcre:;ts,  but  by  c-]DrE:r  identi.Ly  nf  int.~re:JL~,.  :It  in  nol' 
prim<'lr.ily  <1  iJlWGlion  of  d:cvclopinq"  Utcnry  of  2.  nc·v•  world  ecnnt>m.ie  ordr:1·  httl. 
rnthc.r  one  of  integratin9  the  clevtdopin<J  countri  c:o:t  il!J  equal  pa.rl.ners  in  tJ,r; 
wnrld  economy  as  r1uick.ly  al.i  pe>ssibl.e.  The  almost  ilutontatic  consrcqu~~n·::e  of 
this process,  in  which  ~~  cauU ous  and  pragmatic  approach would  have  to  be 
adopted,  would  be  u  new  .i.ntf,rnettion;•l  economic  order. 
4.  One  other  important  poi.nt:  should  not  be  ovcr.l.ooked.  1\l:  a  certain  st:ngc 
in  their devcloprr.ent:  nat.inn:o.  lose  inl:C'rc:st  in  tr.::>de  relations  w.i.. th 'under-
developed  countriMs.  I'Iith  the  arriv<.1l  of  the  post-industrial  ero-t  1:he 
greatest part  of  tlwir.  \vealt.h  has  been  <Jchieved  by  tl1e  devclopm•.'mt  of sc.ie:1ce 
and  technology  and  the  expansion  of reciprocal  trade  relations  betv:een  th·~ 
industrialized  n~tions.  Ilence,  there is  a  grc<'.t  ri.sk  of the  developj.nn, 
countries  bcj 11CJ  left to  soJv,~  their  o·,o~n  economic  problems  ..  befo1:e  a  solution 
in  found  for  11,.~  cl:iffict,.lt·i·:·s  whic],  df"vi··.lnp<:d  duJ:in(;  tlw  colonial  period. 
'J'ldn  iB  a  Hr·cioLw  r.i~;Jz  ;tnd  l:ht~  l.c"rl''J:::  ol  U1'~  'l'i1irrl  Vlorlc1  ell"•·  l'ull.y  ;11vdl'l:  ur 
it.  Thin  .ir:  ;1lno  why  they  \'lou.lrl  J.i.lcte  l:o  fOr<J<?  tHT"'  Jink:'J  rt£1  f'C•e>n  as 
poDoible  with  tltt.'  illdut~tr:i,·tJ.i.zcd  nctUozJr;,  thro\\ql,  UNC'r/\D,  C/\'.t"J'  <)llcl  oLhr·r 
1\fri~nn,  Asiatic  and  SuuU1 
1\mt'J:ican  dE!vclopi ng  couJ,tri  Co'f:  are  s0·,.~k.i.nq  crcd.i. ts  and  custom~>  and  tr<Hl•::  con--
c0ssions  frolll  tlw  US/\,  dii\:·:Jn,  the  r;r·:i..'  dill]  otbc~·  .i.lldustri<d.izl'd  ni'ltion.';,  t·o 
reinfurce  tlH'  n•ul'.llill  economic  dupcnd•cr:co  })(!bvr,.·:n,  Lll•:  dcvelopc~d  nnt1  lP~IG-· 
deiTc loped  coun t:.r ic  f.l. 
Tho  problem  for  tl1l•  '.l'IJird  >-,Torld  i':  in  fuel  to  j'Hlt  on  end  tr;  its 
9  - PE  45.547/fin. co~~r<t:ci.e~;  wi.LI.  <"Cilfl£>  to  }H,  puriplwt:.l  :111d  bl~C0lll''  p.trt  of  a  <Jenuine  partn«r-
!>hip. 
pr:c•r:"·'  r:r.~d  to  (jr·~nt  their  wr.·akr>r.  f.hll'Ulcr:l  speci;ll  an<l  pre  fer~ntiul rights  or 
Clt  l·~:l:~t  to  qiv·~  lhem  ju:;t  treCltmc11t.  '!'he  chnn<JC!l  in  raw  malerials  policy 
in  thn  l.<tut  f<•"'  y•2arr-1  h.1r1  1n:1de ·it  po~;'Jihl.e  to  H'iJ<lrd  thiil  clr~pcndence as  h.1vinq 
<1  rt.!•.rlun."ll  ch<Jr<lctcr  .i.n  v;.tri.oua  .splwn!s. 
'). 
01-ill 
eyt.J 
'I'J 1n  l·:uropcan  conununi Ly  is  awan~ of.  thlA.  Nol·.  only necessity but lts 
.i.ntcrf.!sta,  aince  it:  has  to  import  75"/o  of itn  raw  mutm:·i<.tls
1 
and  lnur;t  have  an 
to  sales outlets  for  its  finished  products,  have  made  it aware  of the  need  to 
chan<Jc  the  international structure  in  favour  of the  developing  countries.  Now 
thnt  the  complex  nature  of the  woild  economy  has  revealed the  interdependence 
batwean  rmtionn,  the  EEC  hu.s  evolved  a  novel  development  concept,  but 
cOHHnentlabl y  hns  never,  in particular during  t.ho  pre paru.tory  fl tacJDS  of  tho 
Lom6  convention,  attempted  to  impose  its ideas  for  solving  the  problems  on 
others. 
6.  1~c European  Community has  concluded  comprehensive  cooperation  agree-
m(~nts with the 1\frican,  caribbean  and  Pacific countries  and  later with  the 
three  North 1\frican states of Tunisia,  Morocco  and 1\lgeria.  These  agree-
ments  establish a  completely new  form  of relationship between  industrialized 
states  and  developing countries.  The  Lome  Convention,  the  UNIDO  conference 
in  r,1.mu,  t110  final  Ret  of  the  CSCE,  the  Seventh  Special Session  of  the  UN 
G10:nura 1  1\s:Jembly,  the~  North-South  •H,tlogue  011  r<1w  ma lm: I <J  1:~  ;md  <leve lopmen t 
problems,  the  fourth  session  of  the  UN  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development 
(UNCT~D)  in Nairobi,  the  EEC  agreements  with  the  three  Maghreb  countries 
<.~nrJ  the  MaDhrck  countr:i...,s,  the  policy of generalized  preferences,  the  Euro-
Arab  dialogue  and  finally  the  Council  decision  of  23  February  1976  on  a 
cornmon  EEC  Afric;;~n  poli.cy are  inter-related  processes  and  have  compelled  the 
European  community  to  change  the  character of its exterrial relations,  making 
it face  up  to itn  responsibil.i·ty  towilrds Africa  and  the  whole  Mediterranean 
area. 
7.  '1'he  days  of  colonialism  c:u:e  over.  The  political,  economic 
and  cultur~l relations  between  Europe  and Africa arc  therefore placed  on  a 
African  politicians,  such  as  former  President Diori  of  Niger  and 
Ho\lph•)uct-Bo Lc1ny  of  l:hc  Ivory  Coust,  have  repeatedly  put  for;.1ard  the  view 
thi1t  closer cooperation  l.Jetwe8n  Africa  and  Europe  ·,rould  llring  long-term 
advant<:HJ~fl  to  both  H.i.cbrJ,  and  not  just in  tonns  of  the  ~conorny. 
Pre~ident Senqhor  of Senegal  repeatedly refer9  to  'Eurafrica'  - in his  opin-
ion  n~ture  ~nrl  other  circumstanceo  milke  Europe  0nd  Afric~ complementary  to 
on()  anot.lHJr.  On  the  occ.-lsion  of bis  visiL  to  I  hn  Pr,r]or:~l  Rt!public  of Gor-
1  ln  cont:ra:1t·,  thl'  lJ:j/\  <1nu  the  UC>SH  .import  n:1ly  l.~i  <1ncl  -~~~  ;,·C!sp"!ctive.l·f  of  their 
r.-, •. ,,  mi'l  t<:- r i.;ll H 
- 10  - PE  45.547/fin. many  lw  ~laid  on  lH  Uctol>t''r  l':J73  in  1\<>n;,: 
<mother  •.. 
convince  us  t11<1t  'J::urufr.ic<t'  is  not  si.n:ply  a  reality of  the•  p~Jsl.  <~!Hl  ,·,  ~)n,b-
lem  of  the  prc[o~nt,  but  is also  tl1C'  pt-otni!o'e  of  the  future.' 
To  ignore  these  ci rcumsti.HJC'.'f;  in  the devcl-
opment:  of Africa would  be  Lo  clist·ecJ-nd  teal potr.nLial.  'l'lle  fact  that  th.i s 
an  obr:taclc.  On  tl1c  contxary,  it would  ;1ppear  th<lt  these  tiC's  an:  being  used 
in  the  int<~res\cr;  of  both  sides. 
8.  At this  point there  are  someti.mcs  s11arp  di.ffc.rr::ncer,  of  C'p.i.rd.on. 
Engliflh-speakj.ng  nation!!,  in  particul<J.r,  seE~  in  these  tit~s  the  conceulPd  cun·-
tinuation of colonial  supn?m,<cy.  For  exaHlple,  1-ihcn  tho  ne(;otLc.tions  fo;:- the 
new  association  agreement  be~an,  several  Engli~h-speaking  aEco~iable  state~ 
entered  the  negoti~tions on  the  ba~is  U1at:  'A{rica  is not  roRcrved  for 
E:urope.'  They  pointed  amon9Bt  otheJ:  things  to  the  monetary  dq.>endencr:.  of 
the  former  Western  and  Central African  territories  on  Paris  and  U1e  special 
tendering procedures,  and  saw  the  reverse preferences  granted  to  the  EEC  by 
the  old  associ<1ted  states  under  the  Yaoundt:\  II Convention  as  a  preserve  of 
the  former  colonial powers. 
Their main  \o!at.chword  is  llfric<'m  unity.  ~tis is supported  by  confidence 
in  their  ovm  intel.lectucll  powers,  the  economic  cap~>bilities and  technical 
abilities  (self-reliance)  and  the political solidarity of  the  African  peoples. 
This  confi.dellc8  and  solidrtrit.y arc  LIJ)held  vis-a-vis  t.he  outside v:orld  in  line 
with  the  'Africnn  Declaration  on  CC>operiltion,  D~velopment.  Rn(1  Economic  Jnck-
pcndencc,'  adoptc·d  <Jt.  the  clo~c  of  Uw •ronth 
African  Heads  of State  and  Government  on  29  Hay  1973  i11  l\cldis  J\b;,ba.  The 
declaration  is  i..o  some  extt:'nt  the  ecCJnomic  policy countnrparL  of  the politi-
cal  charter,  wlJi.ch  was  t11c  most:  impo1·tanl  outcome  of  the  corwtitutional meet-· 
ing of  the  'Orgard.z,1tion  of /\frican  Unity'  in  May  l9Co3.  Point  c  of  the 
declar<:~tion of  May  1973  SLillnB  ctrnongsl.  other  thill<J!l  that  the  govr.>rnments  ol' 
the  l\fr.ican  Stutes  undcrtuke  to  'coordinat.e·ancl harmonize  Urci.r  ntt:itudc•s 
during all  negoti<:~Uons  Lo  prer-;ervc  the  interests  of  the  Afri.c;:m  nati.onr:.' 
This  solidarity  w<:~s  clcmonst.ra\:ed  by  tlw  Africans  in  the negotiations  on  Lht, 
ACP  Convention  <o~nd  it is  Lp:r·otly  to  the  credit of  the>  ECC  l:cprc~cnl:i:•tivccs 
that at no  st<H:JC  of  the  nec;oLialions  did  they  <•ttcmpt  i.:o.  c:rc<ll:c  political 
divisions withitr  Lite  ranks  of the  i\CP.  It was  pn~c~i~;cly tlds  attitude>  ron  the 
p<:lrt  of  tho  Europe;Jn  Con1mtmity  thut  ultimat.ely·p.r:ovcd  instcuu,,;;ntal.  to  t:hr: 
succcsF.J ful  co:1clt1si on  of  t.lo0  ne')rotj ;,!:.ions  and  the•  i ni Liall j  n<J  of  til'"  11t:W 
Convention. 
thilO  thtl  negoliat.i.on  of  lJ,,.,  <l<JL·ec:t~r:nt:·  ~rith  the:  U1n_.,,  r--lc.yltl:t.l•  r-()•.tn\~ 1 -; •. ,. 
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Afr~can,  ca~ibbcan and  Pacific c:ountri0s  can  be  described  as  ~he only treaty  to 
lJe  concluded  by industrialized and  develo·)ing  countries which  c:ompri:;cs 
all the  states of Llack flfrica
1 
The  new  convention  eRn  be  seen  as  an 
ilttempt  by  the  Europe;:m  Community  to practise  new  forms  of economic partner-
ship  i11  a  rcqionally  limited  ~reH,  in particular in Africa.  Tho  1~m6 Con-
vention  iR  the  first  rcsponoe  to  tlte  call made  by  the  developing  countries 
at  tho  Sixth Special  SeiBsion  of  the  UN  Assembly  (April  1974)  for- a  more  equit-
able  distribution of wealth  between  North  and  South.  It  lays  the  concrete 
foundations  of~ new  world  economic  order.  No  other  1;1 uc  of  ind•t~il.d.a l ized 
countries,  either  in  the  West  or  in  the  E•·l:Jt,  hns  so  f<lt:  madA  such  sul.lst<~ntictL 
concerJsions  to the  developing  countries as  the  European  Community,  and  never 
before  have  the  developing countries  come  so close  to their  aim of  being 
treated as  equal  political and  economic  partners  of  Uie  industrialized 
countries. 
10.  The  accession  of Great  Britain to the  EEC  made  it impossible  to continue 
the  association policy  pursued  hitherto,  i.e,  simply to extend  the  Yaou·nd~ 
II  convention.  The  previous  association policy of  the  Six,  which  related 
mainly  to-French-speaking Africa,  was  politically unacceptable  for  the 
British.  In  the  accession  negotiations  it was  therefore  decided  to extend 
the  association  policy to the  commonwealth  countries  in Africa,  the 
Caribbean  and  the  Pacific,  a  solution which  was  acceptable  to all concerned. 
This  solution  is  legally embodied  in  Prntocol  No  22  to  the  Act  of  Accession 
and  w<~s  politically endorsed  at  the  Community's  second  sunur,i\;  r()nf.-Jrcncc  in 
October  1972.  It was  also decided  ~t  thi3  summit  confcrcnc0  Lo  c~~ntc an 
overall policy of development  cooperution  on  a  worldv1ide  scale,  <•longside  lhc 
regional  association policy.  Thus  the  development  poLicy  of  the  Cornmunj_ty 
today  comprises  two  components: 
-particularly close  cooperation_with  the  associated  ACP  coun~ries and 
- less  irttensive  cooperation with  the  other developing  countries2 
1 
With  the  acces:Jion  of  the  Comoro  Islnnd,  the  Sey·~helles and  Su:rir.;'lm  to the 
ACP  convention  Hnd  the  conclusion  of  the  negotiations  with  the  Cape 
Verde  Islancls,  Papu<:l  New  Guinea,  Sao-·'l'orne  and  Principe,  the  nlllnber  of  ACP 
countties will rise  to  52. 
2  ·  I  ·  .  h  Comp<tre  ~n  t us  connect1on  t  e  reports  by  Nr  BERSANI  on  the  Community's  o·,•er-
all dflvclopmellt  cooperation  policy,  Doc.  42/75,  28  April  1975  nnd  by. 
Mr  !U\R7.SCHEf,  on  Community  financial  und  technical  aid  to  non-a~;social:ed 
developing  countries  1976  - 1980,  Doc.  133/75,  18  June  1975. 
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- trade 
- stabili:·~ation  of  export  c;,urinT;  (including Uw  sngaJ~ prntoc,)]) 
- inL1UAtrj al  cr.oper,\i  .. ion 
..  U.tJnnci11l  Hlld  l.r,:lin.l<.·,ll.  ('OC'l"l)",tl'lt.lll 
...  l.llfit:l \:\1\.iono. 
~~c Hections  on  stahili~~tion of  export earningi and  indusL,·inl  cooperu-
tion  are  new  in  cmnpurison with  lhe  Yuound6  Convention.  '!'he  nc>·w  cDnvcn tion 
also  con t·<iins  consider.  able  improvem!"Jll !:s  in  ve>.rious  <treas.  Clearly,  this 
report.  CZ!Jmot  deal with  <tll  thG  a:~pects  of  the  Lom6  Convention1  but  some  im--
portant  features  can  be  mentioned. 
1.2.  'l'hc  Couununity  decided  agRinst  the principle of the  classic  free  trade 
zone with  the  J."(:!ciproca 1  dismantling of  .trnde barrierc.  it grants  the  ACP 
practically  free  access  to  the  EEC  market  and  does  not  demand  a  reciprocal 
arrangem~nt  from  its partners.  Apart  f.r.om  the  obliyi-ltion  to  treat the  Euro--
po<m  Community  FJtates  equally  (without  d.i.F.:crimination)  and  the  principle 
whereby  the  Community  mun t  not  be  tr<Ja tud  1 c!l  ~  favour.;.hly  than  (11\0f.; !:-favuure(.l) 
third countries,  there  arc  no  restrj ctl ons  011  the  J\CP  countries'  trade  a.rran<Jr,-
menta.  The  abolition  of  the  controverfli<tl.  reverse preferences  of  the  Yaouncl6 
Convention  strengthens  the position of  the  EEC  with  rer;pect  to  the  developing 
countries  and  at  the  same  time  reduces  the"tcnsions vis-a-vis  the  US  in  regard 
to trude policy.  In the matter  of originating products  the  Community  agrees 
to treat the  ACP  States  as  one  for  customs  purposes  (cumulative  origin) . 
The  corresponding  Yaou!ld6  ruling was  more  restrictive since it required that 
the  production,  treatment or processing  on  which  the  origin was  based  must 
take  place  in  a  single  country of  the  association.  9G%  of present J\CP  agri-
cultural exports,  including sugar,  can  be  imported  into  the  Community  loJithout 
duty  or  any  other barriers  to  trade.  For  the  remaining  4%  the  Community 
grants  substantial  customs  or price  ~djustment advantages. 
13.  Trade  concessions  are particularly important becduse  they  constitute  one 
of the  most  important starting points  for  improving  the  economic  situation of 
the  developing  countries.  Expr~r  icnce  iu the ·:last  fc'-'1  years has  shown  cle<l r 1  y 
1 See  FLESCH  report  on  the  Lom6  Convention  sianed  on  28  Yebruary  1975  by  the 
EEC  and  the African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific States,  Doc.  283/75,  10  October 
19  7 ~;. 
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<.md  techn leal  coopcrLl  t: ion.  W11<1 t.  use  arc  qrovring  fluanc i.al  resou  x·ces  \:o  ,,n 
already partly  indusLri.ll.ized  conr.try,  whid1  \~.i.shes  t:o  export its indwJtrial 
goods  to  the  E:uropean  market,  if these  LJ.re  to  a  considerable extent  cancelled 
out by  customs  cl1argen  ancl  other  tr<HJe  restrictions'?  f.Xp'3J:ts  in  dt!Vclopment 
policy have  known  for  a  long  time  that  trade policy measu.r:es,  particularly .in 
the  area  of  libera.l..izat:ion  of imports,  arA  usually much  more  impo:r:tant  for  t.he 
development  of  the  recipient count:ries  than  any  v.mount  of direcL  fi.n;Jncial 
aid,  although  this  does  not mean  that direct aid  may  not  be  of vital  import-
ance  in  certain·case~. 
14.  r'or  the  first time,  industrialized countries  and  the  de•1elopinq  countries 
which  export basic products have  agreed  on  a  system guaranteeing  the  latter  a 
certain level of export earnings.  'I'he  STABEX  system  embodied  in  the  conven-
tion  for  certain  important  export products  safeguards  the  ACP  countries  ag«inst 
excessive  fluctuations  in world m"rket prices  and  against  failures  in produc-
tion  caused  by  climatic conditions.  It therefore  offers  a  better lJaeis  for 
steady economic  development.  The  Lom~ Convention  S'l'l\flEX  system  is  a  compro-
mioe  rt:!achE!d  after exceptionally  len•:~ thy  <.md  tcchnica lly complicated  negotia-
tions  lJetwctm  the  Nine  and  lhc;~  l::EC  on  tho  ono  hil.n<l,  ,md  t-.hei.r.  futuru  par.tnr!t:!:l 
on  thn  ot.her.  There  is no  doulJt  that  the  syal:t~ln  i~>  :.{f·il.l  uneven.  lliH~  Jl'l.l-· 
ticular criticism is  that  a  larqe  number:  of  product~ c;'mnot  be  included 
0\'ling  to insufficient financial  resources..  Thus,  the  amounts  provided may 
not exceed  375  million u.a. during,the  term of the  Convention.  It is there-
fore  likely that  th<.:!  aim  of this agreement,  which  is  to  counte~·act  the  hur.m-
ful effects  of  fluctuations  in  export earnings  on  the  economies  of  the  ACP 
countries,  will not be  satisfactorily fulfilled.  At  the  first meeting  of the 
ACP/EEC  Council of Ministers  of  14  and  15  July  1976  in  Brussels,  a  ~esirc was 
therefore  exprcssecJ  [or  the  sy:Jtem  to be  improved,  i.e. by  extending  the  liut 
of goods  and  providing  the  necessary funds. 
15.  Nevertheless,  Uie  adoption  of STl\BEX  ~·epresen  ts  ,1,  subs  tan t:.i..al  .i.tmovut· ion 
and  addition  to the  Lome  Convention.  It  i3  tl1e  first r:eal  attempt  to stahi-
lize export  earnin';I_S  which has  been  embodied  in writiny  .Ln  a  trcat;y  bGtlveen 
industrialized  and  developing  countries. 
arrcrngemcnt  cannot  be  over  cmpha:~ized, 
'L'ltc  pol.i. t l c.i l  s iqn i. fi  Cilli<":•l  of  Uli.s 
bec;.JuHe  t:ht)  EEC  i.~;  hecr~\.,y  pro-
viding  the  first pr.-;ctical  solution  to  a  problP.m  on  vlhi.ch  ult.im<.tl.cly  iJw  cn:a-· 
tion  of balanced  and  harmonious  relations  b•c·t:vrecn  r<'!H  rnd terial  pn.>ducing 
developing  countries  and  raw material  consuming  industrialized  countries 
depends.  'rhis  sy:Jtem  also  f.i.ts  in well  with  the  conc<~[)t of  the  Comrn•1nity's 
cooperul:ion  and  dcv~lcpment policy
1 whicll,  with  q,.,  aiu of an  cxtcn:3i.ve  range 
of mea:>ures  and  allowing  for  tlw  var.Lcly  of  .<Jituat.ions,  aims  at  pr:ovicUng 
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STABEX  is  a  decisive  step in the  right direction which  offers the  ACP 
countries  firm  guarantees  and  places  upon  the  EEC  much  greater obligations 
than  has  so  far been the case  under  existing raw materials agreements. 
Also,  the  stabilization of revenues  from  important  exports,  as  provided 
for  in the  Lome  Convention,  is  a  further  possibility in addition to the 
attempts to create  a.1  'organization of the market  in  raw materials',  since 
this stabilization concerns,  not  world  market  prices for  the developing 
countries'  products,  but their  foreign-currency  revenues,  and  this is what 
the  developing countries are essentially interested in. 
As  reqards  sugar,  a  substantial  innovation  has  been  introduced  in 
relation  l·.o  the YaoUlHlt\  l'onv<'nt ion:  the  community  has undertaken  a  long-
term  obligation to  purch<1se  up  to  1.4  million  tonnes  from  the  1\CP  countries 
at prices to be negotiated  freely  between  exporters  and  importers.  The 
Community  has,  however,  agreed,  if necessary,  to purchase the quantities 
concerned  at  prices to be  negotiated  annually  on  the basis of prices pre-
vailing  in  the  EEC,  which  amounts  to  an  indexation  of  sugar prices. 
3.  Industrial cooperation 
16.  In  the  autumn  of  1974,  before the  final  phase  of the negotiations,  the 
ACP  countries set out  in  a  memorandum  their concrete proposals  for  industrial 
cooperation.  For  the  first  time,  a  section  on  industrial cooperation was 
included  in  the convention.  The  fact  that  a  separate  section is devoted to 
this subicct  is  sympt~uatlc of  the changes  taking  place  in  international 
economic  relations,  whtch  ilrc  aimed  at  allccatinq the developing countries  a 
growing  share  in  industrial production  and  in  international trade  in manu-
factured  products.  By  including  a  section on  industrial cooperation  in  the 
Lome  Convention the  Community  has  fulfilled  a  particular wish  of the  ACP 
countries.  At  the  same  time it is helping to  implement  the resolutions 
adopted  at the  special  session  of  the  United  Nations  on  raw materials in 
April  1974  and  at the  Second  General  Conference of  UNIDO  in March  1975  in Lima, 
under which  the division of  industrial production between the industrialized 
and  the  developing countries is to be  improved.  It will not be  possible to 
judge  the  success  of this industrial cooperation  until  experience  has been 
gained  and  the results assessed by the Centre  for  Industrial  Development. 
In this connection it is to be  welcomed  that at the first ministerial meeting 
between the  EEC  and  the  ACP  (14/15.7.1976),  fundamental  agreement  was  reached 
on  the establishment  of  an  industrial cooperation  information centre. 
Although  the Community  can  only  support  the  industrial development  of the  ACP 
countries by  financial  and  technical cooperation  support  measures  - it cannot 
oblige European businessmen  either to shut  down  capacity or to invest in the 
ACP  countries  - this  industrial cooperation  can be  seen  as the beginning of  a 
new  era.  In  those  ACP  countries which  can  offer raw materials for  processing, 
a  suitable  site,  adequately trained  labour  and,  above  all,  a  favourable eli-
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follows:  tr.E!blin<J  of  thr}  l~nrope:an  D·.~vetopnwr1t  r·unri,  80/~ of Community  firtanc:-
in9  in  the  form  of  non·-rcp<iyetlJlc  ;.1 i d  anct  pre  f,~ ren tia  l  t.reatmen t  for  the  poor·· 
<~St  1\CP  count:dcs.  '!'he  [•nl'~  \vitl  .JH:,1unt  to  3,400m  u.a. 1 ,  including  400m  u.<t. 
in  the  form  of  loilns  from  the  European  Invcstn:ent  Bank.  Public  Community 
uid of some  COOm  u.a.  annu?l.lly  is  not·.  an  insignificant  sur,,  (previous  payments 
to  the  l\7\SM  umount•:d  to  some  200m  u .a. per annum),  especially in the  light. 
of the  Community's  financial  obli.yations  to  t1a}  ol.11er  developing  countries. 
On  the  othex·  banrl,  t.he  ~>um  availabl.c~  under  the  European  ncveloprnent  Fund 
should not  be  overrated,  :;~inc~  the  total  aid effected  Uu:ou<Jh  the  Cnmmunity 
was  no more  Uwn  U%  of  the  bilateral  u.nd  mu:ltilater<Il  aid provided  by  the 
Nine  in  1973.  During  the  negoti<ttiun3 it  w<:~s  e:-:t-remcly difficult to 
increase  the  n.::r;ources  of  the  fund,  .JS  requcatecl  l;y  the  J\CP  countries,  hecause 
r.hc  8COnomic  <1nd,  in  p.:~.r.t.icular,  the  financial  :Jiluation of  the  Comnllmity  had 
deteriorated  considerably  fr.om  1913  Lo  1975.  Un(ortunately  the  application 
<tncl  uoe  of EDF'  :r:esour.ces  have  not  yGt  been  included  in  the  Conununity  budget, 
so  that it is still not  pos3ible  for  control  to he  effected by  the  European 
Pu.rliament.  One  impor t<:<.nt  innov.<.d: ion  is  that  th•~  ACP  countries  hcwe  been 
granted  a  form  of  'co-participation'  in  the activities  of  the  EDF,  i.e.  there 
will be  active pu.rticipation by  the  receiving  countries  in  the  individual 
stages  of  the  implement~tion of a  project. 
18.  It is not  yet possible  to  say  how  far  the  Lun16  Convention will  serve  as 
"mockl  for  relilt.ionn  bet.\vccn  intlu:~Lrializcc,l  <m<l  devnlopi.n'J  r.ountri~s.  'J'his 
iiJ  liOt  !10  11111<'11  i><JCilll1H'  ol  l  ]1~1  .i.lldti<'!JI.I•''CiCS  0r  <.'<'1'1  ;liu  [li:'O'Ji.~iOllfl  Ill'  I ill•  ~Ji•cll t 
duration  nf'  l]ll!  <Hjl'<~f)ll\f'lll,  !Jut  lo  [',Jl.hcr  il  t'I11Hi:JIH'~r1lal  qut~f!l.ion  nf  lhn  pulill·· 
c<.~J.,  cconowi.c  iltHl  ~cvr!lop11e1Jl.  [J0.liC\'  valllc  ol.  '''"··h  <~Rsoc::i;tl.intl  •'I<Jrcern0.nl!L 
1\  ylobal  ctt)J:C"'!ncllt  oJ:  Lh.i.s  kind  hc~s  lhe  adv-·mt~HJe  lh<~t  i.t  r,,.!lps  Lo•.,.:tnls  a 
col•(!:t:ent  policy of coopo:;1t:ion,  exlcndiny  bey()nrl  u·,c  n<tr:rm~r.n:  <~re.:t  of  t-.1\e 
l.t-,ld.itional  C<tp.ital  <-•nd  l:echnical.  ;1icl  into ollwr  are.1s  such  iiS  lra,le,  tourism, 
industrial  coopura1:ion  ,md  the  L.<hour  Htark,.,t,  -1nd  th•,reforc  opens  tltc  ~lil\'  f:or 
mor'c  effective  cnorcli.nation  of  indivi<hwl  mP-<1'>1Jrec;. 
tweGn  indw.H.:ri:.2lized  and  rlcvelopin•J  co.nnt.r.ic:.;  .Jl,~;o  x·edu<.::c  the  d.sk  oi:  differ:. 
encen  in  trc~tment and  '~xclusivc  dev<~J.opment nf  c2rtain  LC•Jlons  in  a  f~.in<JLP. 
economic  u.rc;J  and  contribute  to  T.e<J.i.onal  CGOF<"r .. ll.ion  and  interJcution  on  both 
sides.  'l'hf!  di.sadvantag<'!S  of  such  a<;reemenls  :tl::e  to  b~~  s•::en  particul.:nly  in 
1  r.n  uddition  there arc  l~>nm  u.;L  fnr  the  OCT 
- 16  - PE  45.547/fin. L!Y1s<c  C'Oiltl t  1: i. r  ~:  \·."]l.i.ch  <u:c  11:) t  S ubj c:C l  l  0  t]J,~  iHJl."CC lltCI1 t:.  During  the  pcri0d 
covered  uy  the  Y<•<"mde  Convcn~i.on  (l'"J(,J  -- 1975),  for  cxumple,  in  J\frica  the 
'I"P  h<=ll·:ccn  Fn··n•:l··-:;pcilki.nq  ''nd  En<Jl.i,-1,--~;pc~<:~kin<J  dcvclopinCJ  countri.es  b(>CiiOJC 
v1idcr.  Tl1e.  J,oml'  Cunven\..i (>11  coven;  \ h•~  whole  of lJlack  1\fri  i::a  soulh  of  the 
Sa],,lr;t  ar·.  <t  E.in•-Jl~·  <:C•1tlomic  ar(~<t,  buL neglects  the  developing  countries of 
'l'l1c  inclmd.on  of these  countrjes would,  of  coUJ:sc, 
1\  treaty 
cuu1prin.i.It(j  illl  tle\•<'loping  cntmlrir-s  coulrl  c•nly  be  <Jchicvcd  on  a  wo1lclwide 
h<H<in,  i.<".  involvi.nq  all  t.lH•  Iniljor  1-:.lst·crn  and  1'-/r,stern  industrialized nnlions. 
14.  Cri.t.ics  ur  lhe  Lom6  Convention  ofU•rt  point  out:  that  the  resources  etv<dl-
ithlc~  for  finnnc:i<ll.  and  technical  cooperation,  indusl.rial  coopel.·ation. and  ll!c 
sl:.--tl•i.ljz,-ltion  of export  eurnings  are  mock~sl.  This  is partly true,  but it 
docs  no\"  altr:r  lhc  fact  u,,-,t  this  convE>ntion  is politicaJ.ly  the  most  important 
acJ tr!I:Jr.r·nl·  •,;h i ch  1 h:,  en J.a ~"<Jl!d  Communi t-.y  has  so  fit r  signed.  ll  t  the  sume  t inH•, 
II  nl1Divft  Uii11  t.lHt  lllllnny•cl  J·:uropean  J·:cunorr.ic  ComnJllni l:y  is  c<1pahle  of  unrlet··-
l;,klnq  ncllotJ  .In  t.l1<•  RJll'"'''  nl  Jorrdqn  pollcy,  Altl('t•  litllilit.•r  ll11•  <'otlllllltllily  ,,1 
the·  ~;.i"  nor  thf~  .i.nclividual.  11ember  StaLes  would  have  h<Jtl  the  political  and 
ccr.>nomic  strenyth  to  conclude  such  <•  comp1:ehensjve  c1greement.  Whereas  the 
Yaount16  ConvcJlljon  Wi.ls  only  of  secondory politicul  importance  and  moreover 
wa~;  pt,litically  cm.trovE"rsial.,  the  r,ume  Convention  can  be  seEm  as  a  political 
event  of  intern-tti.onul  significance.  With  the  new  convention  the  EEC  has 
til}:e;l  an  irnpo.rlcmt  slcp  in  intcrnation.:tl  development  policy which  has  already 
producf,d  i1  greul  response  throughout  tlw  world.  The  Lorn~  Convention  can  be 
clescrihed  ,,s  a  genuine  clev0lopment  contract  in  favour  of the  ACP  countries, 
in  which  the  Corrununily  hi1s  C)iven  the  si<Jni1l  for  cooperation with  some  of  the 
worlrl's  poorest  countrier..  This  association  has  a  solid  foundation  and 
could  scrvr:  as  a  p~ltern  for  cooperation  between  tl1e  developing  and  industria-
U./~c·c1  counLr.ir.·n.  Jt·.  in  nf  <'onnirlcr<.li>i<'  iltiJ>Orhlll<'P  that  the  mJitttill  and  cln~;e 
coopcr;:,ti.on  l>cl."ll~C'n  1-:u.ropr'  <tnd  the  <tsr<ociutecl  pnrlners  is  tald.tHJ  place  on· the 
lklsia  of  cornplcle  equality.  The  Community  must,  however,  take  especial  care 
to ensure  thut  lhrc  con[;ult.atl.on  machi.nery  provided  for  in  the  Convention  is pro-
perly  <1pplir·d,  ~:o  t.hal  t11e  cxistincJ  basis  of  trust  is developed  and  not 
.  .  dl  1mpu1re 
20.  'l'he  fir.st  ar-;!~ociation  agrcemon t.D  v,rith  Morocco  and  Tunis in,  which  cume  into 
eifc~ct i1ftcr  lencJthy  ncqoliations  in  1969  were  moclcst  in  scope.  'fhey  ful-
fillod  the  p1:omj o.e  of  <H·l:oociution  which  hud  been  given  on  the  conclusion  of 
Lhr2  EH.'  Treat)'  j  n  19 57  in  tlte  Dec  1 <n·a ti  on  of  Intent  in  favour  of  the 
1  .  . 
/\tlcnt.1on  h;J,;  1requcnt·Jy  J-,ecn  dr<:H·Jn  to  tins  pojnt  by  7\CP  representative~.  as, 
Jm·  r.xarllple,  aL  t·hc  nJe<_d.inc_r  in  Lome  of  the  Joint  commit·tcc  of  the  liCP-J·:Ec 
con,;ul.tn  1:  i vr··  llr;.<;CI>ilJl y 
17  - PE  45.547/fin. ('OUlJI r·ie:J  oJ.·  lla:  1-'L'i:l!lC-i•rU-1.  Doth  c1qr<:~()ffiCnl:s  prnvidcd  for.  limited prefurencc 
0 r.r:.m<Jelllcnts  b\lt  no  fin.mcial.  aid.  'l'hi.!;  <J.rran~y~m,:nt  rema.i.1wd  unattractive  for 
1\lgcr:Lt,  as  lon<J  a:;  no  solttlion  .fo:t·  the  wine  pr:ohl•~m could  be  found.  '.I'll•~ 
ncgoti0tions with  Morocco  <lnd  'fulli!;i.<J.,  <ts  well  <t:3  with  Lellilnon  and  lsra•'l  (scconu 
tJ:uck  ii<JJ:ncmr~nt  !'corn  l'J/0)  <md  Spain  (p:r·eferonti.al  trade  ag.r·e0mcnt  [rom  .1')'/0) 
rllw,·;cd  clo<•rly  llow  ui t'ficu'lt it wus  to  reconcile  Lhe  interc:;Ls  of  the 
<~gricultural  producers  in  the  Moditcrrancan  insido  and  outside  the  Community, 
nltltoU•Jh  at  th.~  s;:une  time  a  common  EEC  <lgricultural  policy had  been  adopl:ed 
for  sur.h  important products  as citrus  fruits  and  olive oil.  In addition  there 
lrJ::t~l  constant pccssure  from  t.hc  USA,  which  was  concerned  about its  mnrkf~c !Jhares. 
21.  'l'unisia,  Nor.occo  and Alueria,  were  concluding  their negotiations with  the 
I::EC  on  new  agr<-:ements  (7,  8  and  17  January  1976  respectively)  just as  the 
1-Jcs t  S<Jhara  con f.lict betw(,en  Morocco  and Algeria  \"as  reaching its first peak. 
'I' be  agreement with Algeria is of particular political  importance  because  this 
countr:y plays  an  influential role within  the  Group  of  77  as  spokesman  for  the 
~~hi  rei  world. 
In  the  identical  pr.-:amblcs  to  the  new  agreements  between  the  l':EC  and  the 
Ua-cc  Naghreb  stut.cs  the  p<1r.lncrs  declare  their  firm  intention  'to establish  a 
ne~tl  model  for  r.eliltions  between  (levelopcd  and  developing  states,  compatible 
wi.lh  l:he  <:tspirations  of  the  international community  towards  a  more  just and 
m0re  1.Jal<1nced  economic  order.'  '!'his  new  model  is  to  be  expressed  in  a 
combin<J.tion  of various  development  measures  within  the  framework  of a  contractual 
relat.ionship between  equul  partner:>,  ~>ccured by  adequate  long-term prospects  and 
a  pcrmi'lncnt  di<Jl.O<JUC.  Provision  has  been  made  in  the  agreements  for  a 
Coopcrution  Council,  supported  by  a  Cooperation  Committee  and if n<:!cessary 
~:pec.i<:1list  comlnit.tees.  ~.'his  is  an  institutional  arrangement  which  CJOCS 
fm:Uu"r.  th<~n  t:ltc  L'GUa.l  joint  comm.ittc~e."l  [or  the  implement·afion  of a•p:c0r.1cnts. 
2/..  '.I.'hc  <lgt·oC'li\UlllrJ  fl,rm  <I  r;o.l.id  lJ<l!;in  .l'or:  l.nt.nn!l.i. Cyin<.J  rr!.Lttl.onn  br!I.Wonn  l~ho 
p:n::  .. nnc-1  anr.l  wi.ll  holp  hJ  i.wprove  t·he  economic  <.lnd  ~Joci.Jl  ::.:.ituution  of'  Lhe 
l·l·"Jhr.ch.  'l'hoy  pr.ovi.dc  fo'r.  the  i.mplcmrml<Jtion  of provisions  ·"'nd  mr:-auures  [or 
oconomic,  financial  and  technical  cooperation,  in  trade  and  in  the  labour 
sector,  The  <HJr<:cT.lents .bct;wccn  the  m;;c  and  the  Maghreb  countries,  which  also 
nn.1st  be  s_ecn  in  roJ.ationsltip with  the  Lome  Convention,  arc  in  the  nat.u:r·e  of. 
cnoty:rul:ion  c:v:rrc'-!mAnt.'l.  It js particul<1rly gr..:\tifyiny  !.:hut  particular slr.ess 
is  to  be  placed  <m  reC)iCJn'll  cooperation  and  t.he  i.mplcment:ati.on  of intGgrated 
'J.'hc  c(Jrc  of:  the  new  i.lcJr<7C!mnnta  is  tlw  section on  cooperaU.on,  ~rthosc 
imp.l0.u\r-ntal:.ion  will  be  f:::1ci  I it:."! ted  by  I::I·:c  aiel  to  the  Ni'lqht·odJ  stntes. 
'l.'hi.:t  ;vi.ll  amount  to  a  tot:1l  of  339  m 11.<1.  in  subGidies  and  cheap 
~ceJlt over  the  next  fivn  your~.  ThiH  is equivalent  t.o  exactly 
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l\la<Jhl"d)  countries  hi1V!c  r!ol  bGen  n8got:.inl<o•d  together but  i.mli.viduall.y with 
eucll  country.  From  !:Jrc  qoo~1raphical point.  of view,  the  Maghreb  countr-ies 
arc  n'uclr  cln:;<:·r  \ n  1'.11rop••,  ;:rro  CC'OI1<)'  .. ilr:dl1y  [;l'.ron~ter  than  the  l1CP  courrtr.ies 
and  snm>.'  of  l.hcj r  pr.n(l,wt ~J  ct.re  in  diu:ct.  compel: i L  io1r  with. CJ::c  product·p,. 
The  ;:rrri1tHJf:lllvnlo  for  the  .irnpo1·t  of  l·l.l<Jhreh  prodr1cts  arc  thc:rcfore  not  so 
generous  .:rs  in  the  Lon16  Convention  w1rich  allo·,m  99.3% of  ACP  product~>  fre~: 
access  to  the  EEC  mar~et.  The  fnllcMing  differences  arG  also  to  be  noU:<i: 
- the  t·li.IC]hl·col>  agn:t:nJ(·n Ls  con L<J.i n  no  <u:ralHJc•t:cnts  sirni lc1r  Lo  the 
ACP  sugar  protorol, 
- there  is  no  S'J'l\lll·:x  system, 
- technical. and  fJn.cmcial  aid  .is  less si<Jnificant, 
- they  conL:d n  a  lllnr<:·  comprel~<cn~>ive  non-discrimination clause, 
bas:icolly  tl>cy  l<Jy  clown  the  prind.f'>J.c  of  frc·e  trade  in  t.he  futlll'<~; 
at  \he  mCiml:nt  t.\lf.:  implication~:  :tre  the  r;umc:  us  for  the  l1CP  comltric!:>, 
- for  the  \vorkers  frDrn  the  1·1aghl"("b  stated  c1!1ployed  in  the  Community 
there  are  cpccial clauses as  regards  social equality. 
24.  From  the  cc:onomi c  point:  of:  vi.<:\·J  tlw  Moghreb  ugreemc.:nts  can  be  desct·ibC?.d 
as  logical  d:::\'elopmE'ntr;,  because  t.hc  exports  fl:·om  'l'unisia,  Morocco  anti 
Algeria,  v1hic:h  ct:rc  ,-cry close  to  Eu1:ope,  arc  m2tinly  intcdcrJ  for  our 
continent.  In  a  suh~'<:qnent review of  the  u<Jreements  lhe  Community  r;hould, 
ther•~fore,  c•u:cfully  ex<lmin'l:the  agricultural  prol;lems  of these  countries. 
Morocco,  which  i~ an  imr,o.rtant  agric:ultur.<~l  exporter,  h<:~s  alrocady  let it be 
known  that it is  not:.  vccl'  happy  alJoul  lhe  ng:cicuJt:ural  arrangements 
because it h,~d  cx.pe.-:b'rl  ~'>Ome  kind  or:  division of  l<~bour in 
this sector.  This  is  also  an  important  starting point  for  helping  the  developing 
countries  because  the  manufacture  anJ  (•xport  of  industrial  products  is still in 
it.s  beginni nqs.  Helpil><~  agricult.ural  c,xpol·ts  to the  industrialized countries 
is at  the  monK·nt.  often  u,..  only  1nr'<1:1s  of  improvin<J  th<'  tr.2clc  baLHrccs  of  the 
devc lopinq  crJ un t.r ier; .  The  signin<_r  of  thit>  conper<rt·.ion  L<•Jrecment  is  mor.c-
over·  an  impor·t ant  !-!l:<eJ•  hy  t.he  E:uropcilll  Conuuuni t.y  t  owarll~;  L<tkinq  cp·culer  rcs-
ponsi.hiUty  in  Lhc  l··i(:d.il<·tTcHIC'itn  ;tnd  .in  i>  C>•rt:ain  ~;en!;e  t.lw  new  agn~c:lilC"n!..'l 
·can  J.,.,  de:c;c:ril,  .. ,]  as  ,.,,,p;··ll!nlentillq  t·lrt.'  Loru6  <.:nnvc·ntion.  'J"l>c  overall.  ::>pproac-ll 
'J'i",  of f<'r  <~  VoJl"i<·l \'  nf  ''PJ'Ul Luni t  i···"'  ror  ''<>-
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'l'lle  MaqJ,rcb  aqrccmcnt!l  can  also 
Lh~  con!i ide  r-<~<~  n~;  ,,  l.Dttt:ln> lone  \ ul.'  Lh<!  implcwen  t<t t ion  of.  Lht.1  Ln~n6  t.'nnvf~n t ion, 
Aincc,  if  thc[Jte  ;HJT:cf!nH~nts  should  fail,  the  gEe  wouJ.,l  only he  l•·ft:  witll  the 
trad  i  t.i.on<t. J.  fonn  of Jcvc lopment  a icl  which  provides  for  little rec  ipr.oc  i ty  and 
has  Jess  symbolic  force. 
25.  The  timetable  for  work.i.ng  out  a  Community  Mediterranean  policy  provided 
that  in  ,July  197 3  nec;otiations  should  begin with  those  developiny  countries 
~lhich  int<Jndcct  to  enter  into  a  new  association.  l\s  the  approachin<J  ne<Jotia-
tions  related  to all  the  independent African states,  preparations began  early 
in  1973  in  thl~  Orgunization  for  African  Unity,  to which  the  three  Maghreb 
states  and  Egypt  also  belong.  Accordingly  these  four  countries  took part 
in  tl1e  opening  of  the  negotiutions  in  July  1973  which  ultimately  led  on 
28  February  1975  to  the  ACP-EEC  convention of Lorn,.  It was  only  the  pros-
pect of  an  agreement  vlith  the  Community  as  part of  its Mediterranean  policy 
which  caused  these  countries  subsequently  to withdraw  from  the  ACP  negotia-
tions  and  it was  then  posEible  for  the  latter  to concentrate  on  countries 
south  of  the  Sahara. 
26.  l\s  part  of  <'In  overall approach· to  Mediterranean policy,  the way  is  now 
clear for cxxpe mticn agreemcnm s.im:ilr to Ire l'la:jl'lreb  ag(~:ments to be  concluded with 
oth0.r  1-lecJiterrunenn  countries which are in  a  comparable  economic  and 
development  situation.  These  comprise  the  ~shrek countries,  which  is  the 
Arabic  name  for  the countries  of  Syt"ia,  Jordon,  P.gypt  and  Lebanon  lying at 
the  Eastern  end  of  the Mediterranean.  The  first  round  of discussions with 
Egypt  (28  January  1976),  Syria  and  Jor~an  (2  and  4  February  1976)  -because 
of  its internal difficulties  negotiations with  L<~banon are  not  scheduled 
t.o  begin  until  J'.i/16  February  1977- showed  that  the  negotiations  have  no 
prospect  of  success  so  long  as  the concrnunity  does  not  grant to  the  Mashrek 
countries wltilt it has  alr;;,ady  granted  to  the  Mac;hreb countries  - namely, 
finHnci<ll  aid.  Eryypt,  Syrio::~  and  Jo~·ddn have  left  no  doubt  that they 
consider  that  balanced  equal  treatment,  i.e.  similar financial  aid,  is 
inclispcns<:~ble. 
27.  'l'he  EEC  thus  found  itself in something  of  a  di. lemma,  since Israel, 
with  which  a  pr0f~rential trade agreement  as  part  of the  'overall approach' 
with  the  proc'lcl"'ct  of  a  free  tr<J.de  zone  was  signed  in  May  1975  and  came 
into  fo1·ce  on  1  ,T11ly  1975,  also  aemanckc.l  balanced  equal  trcatfllr:nt,  at  le<~st 
in  the  sense  that.  i.\:  should  be  given  access  to  Et1ropean  fi.<lclr\<::ial  aid by 
a  section of  the  agreement  on  c:oopcration  which  has  yAt  to be  negotiated. 
fr<liH'C  (for pol i.t.icill  rea.sons)  and  Ireland  (qti  d  c:ountry  ~ti.th  a  lower 
per capita  i nco;:;.;  than ·rsrac,l)  had at  first  been  against  such  an 
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the  fact  tl1nt  Dru.sDels  had  promised  finuncial  aid  to  the  oil  producer J\J.9eria, 
but \vi] 1  not give  them proportionately increased  financial ·aid.  The  opct\ing 
up of the  Common  l·larket,  by  comparison with the  trade  concessions  alrC'ady 
granted  to  Israel last summer,  is considered  inadequate by Egypt.  Even  the 
customs  preference  agreement with the  Community  concluded  in  1973  did  not 
meet Cairo's expectations.  In trade with  the  Community Egypt  is sinking 
oven  deeper  i11l:o>  th61  red:  from  207  m  u. a.  in  1973  to  969  m  u. a.  by  the  end 
of  1975. 
28.  At  their Jolecting  on  19/20 ,Tuly  1976  in Brussels the  Foreign Ministers  of 
the  community  gave  their agreement.  to  finance  forming  part of  the mandate  for 
the  negotiations \'lith  the  Mashrek  countries  on  a  trade  and  cooperation  agree-
ment.  '!'he  total  sum  was  fixed  for  a  five-year  period at  270  million units 
of  account:,  made  up of  145  million units of account  from  I::IB  funds  and  12S 
million units of  account  from  the  Community budget.  These  funds  arc  divided 
as  follows  <~mong the  three countrier.:  Egypt  170  million u.o.,  ~;yria  60  million 
u.a.  and  Jordan  40  million u.a.  In  accordance with  a  decision of the  Council 
of F'oreign t-1inisters  of  13  December· 1976,  the  financial  protocols  cover  a  period 
extending  up to 31  October  1981,  which  in effect means  a  period of less  than 
five  years  after signing  for  the  Mashrek  courlries,  Cooperation \'lith  Israel 
is also to  be  supplemented by  a  financial  protocol,  under  which  a  sum  of 
up to  30  million u.a.  is to be available  for  the  period ending  31  October 
1981.  It was  politically necessary [or the  EEC  to promise  finance  to the 
Mushrek  countries  and  to Israel analogous  to the  Maghreb  agreements,  because 
difficulties would  otherwise have  arisen  for  the  Community's  overall 
Mediterranean  policy  as  drafted  in  1972. 
29.  It is self-evident thllt  the  EI·:c  cannot  employ  power  politics  in  the 
Mediterranc~n.  The  aim of the  Corrununi.ty's  Mediterranean  policy  must  rather 
be  to create  a  new  economic  balance between  the Mediterranean  states  so  that 
it can  develop  into  an  area of peace  and prosperity.  Cooperation with  the 
southern  ~1edi  terranean  states  should not,  however,  be  to the  disadvantage 
of the  agr icul  tu1·al  regiona  of the  northern Mediterranean  area which  <~re 
already in  nGed  of development.  The  Community  countries north of the  Alps 
have  not  yet  fully understood  the vital  importance  of  the  future  of  the 
Mediterranean basin to  the  security of  the  whole  of  Europe  and  ~ts suppUcs 
and  thns il  s  poli ticill  future. 
30.  In  connection vJith  the  Conm1Unity's  MeditPrrnnr:an  po.li.cy,  whid1  rn01i!1Jy 
hils  to  be  ck:ci<.lcd  on  a  political  ba~:is,  brief  reference will  now  be'  m<tdc:  lo 
lllc  fin<'lnciill  implir.ill·iollfl.  '1~10  Communi t y  cnun t  1· i .-. !l  a r c  i n  ;,  c  l i  f  f i cult 
s.i.L1wLion  in this  reElpcct,  insofar  <11:  Lhe  Forciqn  ~1ini.BU.·1·1.;  ii<Jvc  e11l<·t·<,d  i11Lo 
fin<Jnci.i:ll  ul.>liq~tion!;  wi.th  the  Mac;hreb  counll"i.c11,  l'laltn,  Yucjos.lavia,  l'or·lu<jal 
and  now  tl1c'  ~1~tr.:hrc.~k  counl:l"ies  and  Isrucl  as  w<'ll,  which  are  to be  met  frorn  the 
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1 'i  tJ,.vn  1"•::;,)\JJ<'t·~;.  i\1-.  t 1;.·  111'-):nent·  I  i1l'  r,;1nk  pr·oct.Jrc!.l 
,,L•H!I:  l,nno  r.ti.l.J.ion  rlr:d.l<~t:;  peJ:  ;.lll"'''"  ,m  <~v<.":;"j''  nn  tilt~  •:•lpi.t·'ll  markL·I_~, 
to  ft~lfil  iU:  o])li.(pt:i.OII!>  to  pnlmOt:(!  ,.,.,d.on<:1J.  ;:.nd  sl:rucl:m·;:~ L  policy pt·oj•.:.cts 
in tho  Member  St<ltes.  Ncr,,  it also  h.:t<>  l:.o  eann<uk  400  mil.l'ion  u.<t.  (1.9'/S-
1 •n <))  for.  t liP- l\CP  count  J:i cs,  and  ot: her  resouJ.Tr~:;  for the  r~.)<Jh reb  ilgrr;cments 
(167  million  tL<l.),  for  the  fin;~nc-i.a.J.  ['l:Otocol  i.n  favour  oC  /lillta  (2G 
mill.ion  u.a.),  fo.r.  the  in:nH·cliaL:e  <1ld  l:o  Por·tu9ul  (150  mi.lli••n  ll.i'l.),  ~1hich 
h•l!J  only bec.:n  ptotniscd  [•n·  two  ye:n·:~  ;uH]  wi.ll  J.Hnl>:•b.ly  l••.!  Lnc.rr:Lir>ed  :-;con. 
Ytl':'J013l<~via,  which  han  h<Hl  a  trade  '-l\Jrrcment  with  th<'\  J·~EC  si.ncc  1  October 
1973  ilnd  considers it important  to ba  treated  not  as  a  stale-trading 
count.ry bnt  as  a  Mediterru.ncan  coun1:1:y,  h<1s  be0n  qrantecl  a  lo3n  of  50 
mi.l.lion  u.a.  fr.orn  the InvcGtmont  Bank.  Under  tho decisions  adopted  by 
the community's  Foreign  ~iinisters in mid-October  1976,  the  Mashrek  states' 
share of the finance is  145  million u.a.,  and  this  figure will be  further 
increased  whcr1  negotiations with  Lebanon  have  been  concluded while Israel 
is to have  30  million  u.n.  To  this must  be  added  the resources promised  in 
principle by the council of Ministers totalling  '310  million  u.a.  for Turkey 
and  290  million  u.a.  for Greece  {five years)  details o(  Lhis  aid,  part 
of which will be provided by the  European  Investment  Bank,  have still 
to be  laid  down  in financial protocols.  Financial aid of  t:llis  order is only 
posnible if 'the  flank's  resources arc  increur~ctl  and  if such  aid is not 
rJ(Jducted  from  t:he  resource!;  which are allocated to the structurally we<tk  a.rca.s 
of the  Member  States  o£  the  EEC  via  tltf!  InvcstnH!Clt  Bank.  '.l'he  Finance 
Ministers,  who  are at the  same  time Governors  of the  Bank,  are therefore 
urged  to make  the additional  resourc~s available  for this policy. 
31.  The close  economic  tics of our.  contracting partners  ancl  the financial 
olJJl.gations  ent<;red  into  under  the  l\CP  Convention  and  the overall  JvJedi.terr-
anean policy will  have  far-reoching  consequencc8  for  th~ economy  of the 
Community.  .Cn  f.>drticulai:,  the promotion of industries  ?.lid  other production 
.>ectors which  al.'e  parlly in  competit.i..on with  our  own  economy will affect 
development  in  the  Corrmnni t y  it  self.  \Vhcr.C!  I: here is  norm:-~1  growth  the 
burdens. will be l:>e<trablc.  'l'he  qu~sti,,n,  howE·ver,  i.s  \•Jh<".l-.  happens  if there 
i.s  no  increase in  gro>>th  in  Europe  but  sti\gnal'.i.on  ox  t.:ve:.  a  reduction? 
lL  is also important  for.  pr·oducers,  trade  union!;,  banker::;  and  business,nen 
to be  involved  in this cnoperation  process.  Trade  inv0ot~~nts in the 
form  of  joint  prujcctu  ~nJ  long-term  ~ontracta co•1ld  be  very  succ~s~[ul. 
A.'3  buainc.':Jsmcn  cannot:  undertake cnrt;, in  ri:sks,  r:oopr:cc\'~; ·:;n  hnt\>IC'ell  pri.v;'l\'.0 
(!1\l:r:>rpriso  and  the authorities is i.ndi.spcnsabl.e.  'rhe  fun,·:t. i CHI  of  L·hc 
ot:fi.ci.al  bod.ie[l  ::;hould  conr;i..st· mai.nJ.y  of  ne•joti,lti.n<J  wi.th  l.hr~  governments 
o[  l..hc  reccivin•:r  countries,  gllarantet~·Lnq prival e  and  ptll>lic  undcrtaki.nqs 
CI~J'li.nst  politic;:!]_  risks  and  possi.J)ly  cri  vi.ng  £inr.ncial  su)pol:t  and  defi.nr.ng 
th·~  fr<Hn,~wot·k  for  th~··  dev•!lopment  proj<:-ct.s. 
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made  it ess<m tia  1  for  l h•'!  Eul'opc<tn  Comwuni ty  to  de fine  its at ti  t.mln.  On 
G  Novclnhcr  1973  the  Cc•nununity  Fondgn  Ministers  publi:o;h<Jd  a  dc:clac;:.t~.0n  on 
the~  .f\U.ddle  E11st  in  v1h:ich  the  COJt,~·,\\\1\:lt.y'g  Me111br,t'  Stut-.l'!S  SL1mmarized  thc'u:  por,;il.]on 
'on  thf' Middle  r.ast.  guo:3tion.'rhe  positive  reHponfH?  of. the  7\rab  (;tatcs  t.o  this 
~1iddle  Enst declaration was  fully  confirmE'd  five  weeks  lvter when  four  Arab 
Ministers,  includin<J  ~.he  O:il  MinisLers  of  Saudi  Ar.:~bia  and  Algeria,  c>ppeared 
in  Copcmhagr'n  to  submit,  on  behalf of  the  20  member  states of  the  Arab· 
Lee~gue,  t.hc:i r  proposal  for  a  dialogue  to the  s'lmm:i t  meeting  of  the  Com-
munity's  Heads  of  Government.  'l'his  was  fortunate  inasmuch  as  the  Heads  of 
Government  also ndopted  at  that meeting  the  'Declaration  on  a  Euro}~ean 
Identity'  which  had  been  in  prcporation 'for  so  long  and  point  13  of which 
reads: 
'The  Conununily will  implement  its  undertakings  tm;rards  the 
MediterraneaH  and  African  countries  in  order  to  reinforce 
ite:  long-stanJing  links "'ith  these  countries.  The  Nine 
intend  to  pre~erve their historic  linko with  the  count-ries 
of the  Middle  East  and  to cooperate  over  the  establishment 
and  maintenance  of peace,  stability and  progress  in  the 
region.' 
In  January  1974  France  prcsent.cd  a  concrete  plan  for  t:he  initiation of  a 
Euro-Arab  dialogue  anc1  in  the  subsequent weeks  a  consensus  formula  was 
worked  out.  This  expressed  the  view  that  this  initiative should  not  hctmper 
international efforts  in  the oil and  raw materials  sectors nor  interfere 
with  the  diplomatic efforts  for  a  peaceful settlement  in  the  l1iddle  East. 
33.  'l'he  Euro-l\rab dialogue has  not  so  far  produced  any  concrete measurable 
rcsultn,  but its most  important  effect  is  that it takes  place at all.  It 
is  to  the  benefit of  tl>e  div.logue  that,  ap<1rt  from  a  netv1ork  of bilnteral 
links,  the  Connunity already maintains  a  number  of  contr~ctual relationships 
with  some  Arab  countries.  'rhese  are mainly  agr.eement.s  \vhi.ch  have  heen  nego-
tia  t.ed  o.nd  concluded  with  the  ~1ecli t.errane<1n  countrj Gs  as  part of  the  Com-
munit.y's  overull concept,  that  is with the  Nort,h  ll.frican  und  other l·lfrican  and 
\ 
Arab  Btates bordering  on  the  Mediterranean.  'l'he  agrecrnc•nts  not.  only  pr·ovide  for 
customs  advantages  but also  real  cooperation  in  the  economic  anrl  fi n<Jnc.i al 
sectors.  Some  l\r<~h  countries,  namely  the- f;udall,  Maur.l.'l:<·mir;  anrl  So!ll<!lia,  ar:r:: 
also  p<·nt.i('s  to  the  Lr>1ne  Convention.  'I'l1c  f.1.'tshrck  count.ri..:!s,  w.ilh  whom 
negotiations  h<.~ve  IHM  hcen  concJurlcd,  are  also  part-.icipants.  •rhe 
EUJ:o-l\rc\1!  dLJlO(JUe  i~~  therefore  ~upplemcntinCJ cxistin'J  n'lationsllips,  in  that 
links  hi!VC  been  cstal•li  r:;hr~d  behJN'rt  the  Nine  <~.nd  t.he  /'.r <1b  states when!  pr.e-
Viously  tl\('1'<"!  were  ll(>DC.  l\s  U1c  Cummunity  <1l.J:cady  w,·.inl<tins  clo~:c  rclatio>ls 
- 23  - PE  45.547/fin. •,rith  I:Jc.tel,  lhi1;  di  li.O•f'l<·  has  il  lo~ic:al  poli.U.·:al  pl  .. 1ce  in  the  ovcrilll  con-
t  •'t'L  of  t:uropca11  puJ.i..-y  un  the -M('dil.err<HI0ctl1  drJ..!  Africa:  it enaur•!s  p;~rallel.Lsm, 
>,Jl•lch  is  th•·!  chief  cl,~mr;~nt  in uny  policy  Z~imed at  equilibrium. 
Jll.  For  t:l1c  Arab  countries  thir;  <1i~logue ia  .:111  i.mporLilnt  component  in  the 
jut;tificati.on within  the  Arab wot·ld  for  the  inception  of prcfcr.enl:ial  rcl'-1-
ti.ons  with  the  Europ0.an  Community,  but  also  a  means  of  conflrming  their 
cxpectntions  that in  between  the  major  pov1ers  of  the  USA  and· the  USSR 
ther~ is  another  source  of support.  The  Arwbs  would  like  to stay nt an 
equal distance  from  the major pC\ters  and  maintain  some  cooperation with  both 
super-powers.  They  consider  the  Europeans  as  their partners  on  this route 
towards  the  future.  ~1ey place more  hopes  in  the  Euro-Arab  dialogue  in  the 
long  term,  because  they believe  that in  this way  they  can  be  kept  out of the 
rivalry bet\·lcen  the  supcr-powerl:l  and  their interests.  In  their view Western 
Europe  holds  the  important political role  in  these  efforts of  the  third 
force,  strong  enough  if necessary  to offset the  influence  of  one  or  the  other 
super-power.  This  is where  Europe's  opportunities  lie,  and  Europe  can  only 
uU.iize  these  opportunities within  the  European  Community,  since  no  European 
industrialized country  on  its own  will be  able  to make  the  contribution which 
the  Arabs  expect  from  Europe.  To  this extent  the  Euro-Arab  dialogue  is  con-
si.dered  ·to  supplement  the  Community policy entered  into with  the  r,om~  Conven-
tion  in  such  a  way  that  a  system of Mediterranean  agreements  should  now  fol-
low  as  a  logical development. 
35.  Cooperation  between Western  Europe  and  the  Arab world  can  theoretically 
take place  on  two  levels:  the  level of the  Middle  East conflict,  with its 
political  and  military dimensions,  and  political  and  economic  cooperation 
outside  this conflict.  It is clear that at  the  level of the  Middle  East 
conflict  the  Community  has  too  fe•,v  opportunities  for  influencing develop-
ments  alongside  the  super-powers. 
concentrated  on  the  economic  sphere. 
based  on  very real mutual  interests. 
Arab  expectations  are  therefore muinly 
In  this sphere  the  dialogue  can  be 
The  economy  of the  European  countries 
suffers  from  a  certain geographical restriction,  and  in  particular it lacks 
energy  <\nd  ra\'1'  matcriuls.  It is highly  dept~ndent  on  imports  and  exports 
and  always  nocda  trading  partners  Ln  order  to. remain  v:i.able.  T'he  lrnporl:ance 
of the  Arub  nmrket  for  E!nrope  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  in  1975  exports  to 
the  llrab  League  countri.es  rose by  44%,  while  imports  Ud.l  by  16%.  'rhe  Arab 
countries,  on  thP.  other hand,  require technologists  rtn<l  knm.f-'-hO\v  in  industry, 
C~rJriculture,  marketing  and  other services.  'rhey  need  employment  for  their 
population  in their  own  countries  to prevent  them  emigrating  to foreign 
industrial centres,  and  they alao  need  access to a  large market,  for  example 
the  Europ:!an  Community  market.  •rhe  l\raba  can  purchase  industrial plant 
nnywhere  in  the  w01:.ld,  but  only  Europe  is  a  real  pnrt-.ner  for  .,.,hat  comes 
a fterwurdn,  ;.1nd  ultimately determines  success  or  fai l1u:e,  namely,  nwintninin'J 
!Jkil-lt:'d  pl.-orluctioiJ  anil  selling their products  i.n  the  long  term  on  markets 
•,tllich  are within  reach. 
- 24  - PE  45.547/fin. 36.  'I'he  jmporLJncc~ of  t1t<'  E11n~pc. 1 n  comp0ncnL  in  <l•.'l ennlninq  111c:  future  ec:onu-
mic  and  poli tic«l  com:se  of  th0  J\r<llJ  world  h.Js  lJ.::c<'l"C  st.J·ikin<JlY  cl<!ar  in  Ute 
eHt:Clblishmcnt  of  the  Euro-1\.r:<lh  d.iulO<JllC.  'I'his  is  t1'robubly"  the  rind:  ti.Iilc 
that  two  cuch different  econot~Li.c  areas  und  cultUJ:·es  have  attempted  to define 
fundamentally  t:he.ir.  mutu<Jl  relations  jn direct discussion.  In  view  of  the 
multiplicity of ccouomic  and  social structures,  it is difficult to establish 
gencrill  and  flexible  outline  condition~;  and  it is obvious  that such  a  complex 
undertaking  needs  time  for  Bolving all the  problems.  In  the  Arab world 
there  nre  ricl1  und  poor  countries,  sparsely  populL~tcd desert areas  and 
heavily populated  regions.  The  MembeL·  States of  the  Conununity  also  have 
differing economic  structurP.s  and  do  not  have  the  same  technical abilities. 
So  f~r no  concrete projects  have  been  undertaken  hut  the  negotiations hither-
to hiwc  shown  th:·:t  lhe  Buro-Arab dialogue  can  certainly produce  real results 
which will be  to  the benefit of both sides. 
37.  The  long-term alm  of  t.llis  dialogue  should  be  f'Conomic  interdependence 
between  the  two  areas  and  the  creation  of  a  large  single area  around  the 
Mediterranean.  'I'1Je  intensity of  the  coopcru.tion  v1ill  of course  ult:imately 
make  it inevitable  for political questions  to be  included.  'I'his  dialogue 
is not  a  question  of exclusive  relations  between  one  side  and  the  other,  but 
involves  close  cooperation  finding  its natural basis  in the  geographical, 
historical,  cultural and  human  circumstances.  Although  there  are  signs  of 
a  successful  long-term  form  of Euro-Arab  cooperation,  it is not  yet possible 
to be precise  about  its  fut.ure  form.  'l'h:l.s  is,  of course,  characteristic of 
the whole  situation  in the  Arab world,  since political reality  shows  that _this 
part of  the world  is  in  a  state of  dynamic  development,  the  outlines  of \"lhich 
are not yet clearly defined.  In  any  case,  the  Eur·o-Arab  dialogue  is subject 
to what  must  necessarily be  a  long-term process.  'I'he  European  Community 
must  firot  understand  the  clwnges  nm-1  taking place  in  the  Arab world  and  must: 
aloo be  prepared  to revise  lhe  1Jctckneycd  ideas  of  the  p<1st.  If Western 
Europe  can  do  this- and  in  view  of the  geographic<tl  pr:oximity  this  should 
in  fact  be  possil>le  - the  foundations  \vill be  laid  for  the  construction of 
new  and  fruitful  relations  between  Europe  and  the  1\rab world. 
38.  In  Euro-ArAb  relations  t:od<1y  we  are  witnessing  a  turning-point 
chnractcrized  by the  joint political,  economic  and  cultural  dialoc;uc  between 
the  nine  ~a~c  Memi'E!r  States  and  the  twer.ty slates of  the Arab world,  which  is 
taking  place at  a  number  of  levels  and  is expected  to :Uear  fruit  in  the  l.OIHJ. 
term.  This  cli<1logue  is esr.entially based  on  cert<',in  principles,  condition:; 
and  objectives which  call  for  mutual  trn.st  in  an  equal  degree  from  both  siclr•s. 
It elllbruces  viJ:tlJ,~lly all  the  sphere~;  in  which  slates can  coopel:r~tc,  and 
rer>rcsents  i3  quillitr~tively  nc\v  att.cmpt  ut:  forg.in<J  link[]  bindinq  two  regionn. 
It marks  the  beginning  of  n  new  chapter  in  the  hi~;lory of  these  two  nei9h-
bou1·ing  rc<Jion8,  whi.C'il  complement  one  <111nt·hcr  11ncl  ;Jrf:'  predesti nPcl  fo1·  fa1·-
- 25  - PE  45.547/fin. ;,nd  ,·ll(,.''l'  .~uppt i-"::  or  <!r·n·lc  oi.l,  '"hi J..:~  :···ltlY  rJi.l·· ;•r<  .. •!ti<  i.n~1  t1r·a<'  cotmt.t·ics  r.1r<: 
pr;l!J."Jr·ily  cOnt··~r·ll'~d  t:o  ~i<~<:!lrt·  L.he  L~~·-;l.  l:"J:;:;i~Ldf.~  1,,  ii::'~;  (or  tlh~i.r  :nin~t~l 
'''':'t•l.t.ll  ''nd  d1:Vt~lnp  th(~i.r  nwn  , ..  {)il!.lilliJ~:;  :·;u  Llldt:  w}~(i[  1~1t<":i.r  oil  1''-='!JOI<l-cns  <1t"f! 
For  1.11  i!l  they  n•-'•Jtl  the  <:HJs i.:;tctncc  of  t.ltn  indu~>td<ll  cn11ntries.  L  t  mu y  l he  1:<! ·-
fore  be  naid  thill".  Lhcr·~  i3  a  clo•;e  cot:'re~q_•on<lence  bc:t.wr!en  t.h('  int·erc:>tn  oF 
th~  i.ncluntr:i:1l  .•1nd  lh••  oi J.--pl·orlqci.nrJ  cou:-~t-t:·.i.cs,  v:hone  r.t!all~;Jti.on  lwF~  mcrel•t 
h•!en  •klayed. 
I,ike  thC"'  l:<'r;t  of  the  ~'lcsh~rn  woL·l,J,  the  r:r::c  O"wls  oil  nn<l  !:hr.  cooperat:ion 
oE  the  oil-producinq countrie::;  if it  i:;  to  solve  th<?  pr.ohlen~''  conn<:cted  w.i th 
forei,Jn  currency  surpluses.  '1'1\e  oil-prOtlucing  countries,  on  the  other  hand, 
hnve  a  long-te:r:m  r1flCd  for  thE'  i.ndustri;ll countries'  know--hm-;  and  productive 
capacity  in  Ot'(?<'-c  to make  prnper  usa  of  the  pctrolt!um  dollar~>  f.lm~ing  into 
their. coffers.  These  differences  of  int•2rest:,  which  are  temporcn:y  r<Jther  th<tn 
basic,  might well  he  reconciled  through  [ar-reachin<J  cooperation  between  the 
two sides.  To  c.chieve  this will  r.eqnire  much  time:  ancl  patience. 
39.  The  1\rab states also  see  the  E~t1~o-·Arab di a l.o<JI.H?  as  connecl;ed  w.l th  the 
new  internation,)l  economic  on'ler,  und.~r 1·1hich  the  lc:;s  industrialized  counl'.ri.es 
will  promote  t!IP.ir  01~11  inclll!ltrlalL-:;ltion  and  expect  the  indus~.r.ial countries 
not  only  to  expnr.t  the  muchinery  and  tec.:hnolo9ie~J  needed  by  the  de vel opin•J 
count.t:ics  but also to  open  up  t:heic  m"lrkets  to  the  li.ltter' s  finished  and  scmi-
finiHh•~u products,  while  the  industrial countri.r":  :;hould,  .in  thr.  llra}l  vi£!.,, 
opeci<\lize  fur.tl1P.r  in  goorh  <1nd  scrvice'J of  a  morrr  r;ophist.i·~·1lccl  nilturc. 
I:'ine~Uy,  it 111<1y  he  !lilid  !:hilt  the  J·:uro-·1\r<t]J  cli<\J.o<JII<:  iH  i.n  tlH•  inLerents  oF 
bot-.h  Hi.des.  Poti.ti.cally,  it  rwrvnr.J  lo  !'<'!move  Uw  l:r<1cen  of'  former  enmit.i<'!s, 
It w~kus possible political  and 
economic  coopcl:dl:ion  to  the  arlvuntuye  of both  siuL'S  and,  moreover,  pr.omotcn 
international  pc<:tcc  ancJ  secrtrity. 
40.  'l'he  report  in  concarnr"<J  muinly 'rlilh  conun0rci.~tl.  rclati.on13  bt:l:\ofecn  Lhe 
ELn:opcan  Commun i.l:y  al\d  1\fric-:~.  llowe'J''lr,  since  economic  and  political as-
pects  urc  clo?:l<]ly  linked  -- one  e:·wwple  being  t1le  Mi.ddle  Ba.st  contlict,  us  a 
r.esul  t  of which  t.llc  Euro·-Ara!J  dia loque  cumc  in to  being  - it is  nflce::;s<u:y  in 
tllis  t::Oittext  t0  consider  al~:o  devcl.op:n.:•nl:•>  in  Sot!l;llcrn  1\fri.c<r,  ;;nd  espaeial.ly 
the  ettt  .. itudc o[  tlH!  l-:llrOf)"!•lrl  Conununity  tow,u:ds  cnnf Jirts  i.n  tlr.ll.  p.rt·t-.  l)f:  the 
wor·Jd,  for·  ll  in  h<lrdly  c<•ncciv.ll:d<!  i·IJ:rl  l·:un'>t'''  :rl:'>'lld  rli:J.'d>•.';,,ll•  ii.:Jt.•IJ'  Jrolli 
t'lli.FJ  TC.'lf'OIIni.J>i.lit.y,  rarliclllilrJy  ell  'l  l.tlllC  \'/]Wil  il.  in  r,l,Jirj''d  Ill <.'<!llllid<•r 
what  it:1  propr~  1:  pl<lce  i:~  in  <1  lli'!':Jly--P::;c:rcJ.i nq  Lnt•c r "'-' 1·.  Lon;,]  JJ:,  I ::nee  <lf  fCJrcc:~. 
'I'his  poi.nt  wa"  lJJ:DU<Jllt  oul  lic't·y  cle<~rly  un  17  UO\'<~r:1h:'r  lSl'!G  <~t  '1  meeting 
bet\vcen  rcpre:;~,nti t:ivcs  of'  th·~  Co1nmi c"i.nn  illH.l  mcmh•.  rc:  of  rhc  Cr.,Jnl<t"Ll'tc-:'!  on 
Devel.opm(~nt:  antl  Cooperoti·)ll,.  ;··!dflY  r;pc~~~~,..~r.s  c_Jn  L1l;,t:  0CCct:"ljnp  cmr·hdSLZE!d  t.htll.: 
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1 •~  tn /\fi:ic,·,'r;  politi.c<Jl  problem~~: 
Europe  C'Jnn~Jt  C~ffortl  Lo  lJc>  rcp:u~;cntcd inl\frica  merely  )·.y  the  Lo~t•0  Conventi.on; 
i ls pol it  .i.ca 1  pre  r>:: n::c  is  a l  ~~o  i:cqu i.rcd.  ln  line  with  its ecoi\OiotLc  position 
in  tlt<~.  W~>rld,  the  }"ut  i.'l.'"an  Cotat·u;ud.ty  corosce<.ruently  lw~;  .CI  duty .to  hc•lp  in  soJ,vinCJ 
lhe  prcit•lcm~<  .it•  the  c:xln~m('  ~:o~1th  of 1\frica,  to guioc  c](,vclopm<~lltR  into rno:re 
pt~ace ful  anll  reast•ll,lhl c  pat1~:·  .. 
41.  PorturJal'A  clc•fc'<t1.  in  ltc1:  cDloni.'ll  W·~J:  in 1\frica  <tntl  the  ros11l.tant:  inclepen•l-
encr.  of  ~·i•:>z<trr.biguc:  and  f•r~<JOLt  i ni tiat.ed  rh1V<~lopmenls  in  Sont.l,.~t·t,  .1\l ri Cil  l:hl! 
implications of 1.,rldch  cannot  yet  be  fully seen.  Not  only  was  the 1\ngolan 
civil w~r surprising  bccaus~ of  foreign  involvement  in  the  inturnal  affairs 
of  the•  former  Portugur.se  colony,  but also developments  in  tvm  other  regions 
of f.:ol\tltr,.r,1  Africa,  namely  [>oulit  \vest  Afr:i.ca/Nami.biv.  and  Rhodesia,  are  full 
of  impr.>ndr:!rable~:.  ln  addition,  Uwre  <t:c·e  the  interual difficulties of  the 
Repuhl.i.c  of  South Afd.ca. 
42.  Since it was  founded  in  1963,  the  Organization  of Africu.n  Unity has 
played  an  importu.nt  part.  in  the  political.  and  diplomatic  foreground  of  the 
conflict over  a  chamJ<~  o [  po~;cr  in  Southr·n1 Africa.  The  adoptior,  of  the 
'InlcJ"I><lti.onal  Convvnt·i.on  on  L1tt:  SupprP.,o;r;.ion  and  Punisllllwnl  of  thr.  Crime  of 
Aparllwid'  by  the  29lh!!ession  of  tlte  UN  J\osernhly,  t.he spP.cJal  funrJ  to  Huppol"l: 
the  libc.rationmovcmcnts  oper<~lin•J  .in  Soul.hern Africa  ~;ltich  was  dccidetl  on  a 
few  months  ago a11d  to vlhich  t:he  churches  are alh,wed  to contribllte ari?, the  cles-
crlnti0~ of  south African  apar~eid policy by tbe then  US  Ambassador  to  the  UN· 
during  one  of the  latest  South  Africa  debates  in  the·r~  ~ecurity Council as  an 
'ugly  !C):i me',  arc only  some  of  many  examplen  of  succc[;::;ful  action  by  the  Oi\U. 
'l'he  re!.slstance  of  the  OAU  to  thc white  bloc  in  Southern 1\frica was  shown 
with  gJlb<tt  clarity at the  0.'\U  conference  <1t  the  end  of July  197S  in  Kampala. 
Resolution  422  (X.X:V)  of  the  or,u  Council  of Ministers  states,  for  ex<'unple, 
that  the  'ahominablc  and  retrogressive vpurtheid  regir:te'  of South 1\frica  and 
the  'rehcl racist minority  rerJinte'  of Rhodesiil  must  be  completely  isolated 
and  opposed  by  every means.  It is not possible  to  discuss  here  the  fact 
that  many  of  the  states  standin9 behind  this  res.olution  disregard,  as  much 
as  the minority  govr~rm"cn  ts  which  they  a1:e  opposing,  t]Je  ci  vi  1  and  humun 
rights  Hhi.ch  they  i'IH~  constantly  upholthng,  but  this  should  not  remain 
·unmentioned.  For  lhe  future  pc•licy  of  UF!  Ol\U  tow<.~rc'ls  the  remc~in.ing  \~hitP. 
bloc  in  r;outhern  l\fric<~  it.  is  important  th<lt  the  12th  Summit  Conference  of 
Afric<tn  llr:ads  of  r;t;1U•  uncl  Covcrntnent  ul.so  cndon;ed  llH~  'Declar<~tion of Dar-
cs-Su.latnn  on  SouLh~~rn  T\fricu'  <ttlopt:cct  in 1\pd.l  1975  hy  tl•e  9th  Exlraortlini:try 
MeeU ng  of  tlw  Ol\U  Council  of l'lini:;tcrs.  The  corre!;pon<1i.ng  resolution  sUttcs 
amOii(JnL  othnr  lhinqt;  that  tltc  CJ(h'('rl'll11('111.  in  i'n~tori<•  - ;,nd  this  applic~• also 
to  ~:outh 1:cnt  1\f.r i c,,  <ond  l<hoclct; i  ..  :J  - is  ,,  'product.  of  coloni<.~l.io. l  C'<>nquest  n01·1 
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oar-P.ll-SalaL1m  ;mrl  Kilmp<..~l.Ll,  Um  deb•.lt.v;,  r111  SouLi1  Atri.ca,  :;olll.h  h'0.st  Afr.ic  ...  Jn•.l 
Hloot.lc!Ji.l  i\t  l:hc  2'Jth  c~ntl  1Uth  ses:Jionf;  oL  t:h•.:  l:!·l  <t:·::: •. :mhly  \·J•·r·:  m.tr·\(tec.1  1101:  \,-y 
a  apirit of  d(,U.Jnl:r.:  but  ~>ll•·•  oJ'  confrnnL1tLon. 
the  0/\U  in  rer::en t  yearn  ha~;  bcnn  incre<t~;  .i ng Ly  a•Jcce;,s fu l  in  il<<lk .i  il<J  the  G(•zw r.ll 
Assembly  of  the  united  N.:ti".ions  its mo•.zt11picce  in  t:hi.s  matter.  Foe  exm:1pl.e, 
at the  rnqucst of  the  0/\U  Lhe  fono<Jt:  ·~.;pecial  ComrniU:ee  on  r.p.ntheid'  of:  the 
UN  General  Assembly  WdS  rcnamr~d by  Resolution  J 324  D  (XXlX)  <ls  'Special  Com-
mittee  against Apartheid.' 
43  In  spite of Prctoria'n  external efforts  to  achieve  detente,  South Africa's 
internal conflicts  continue  to persist.  The  fut.e  of  the  Republic  of South 
Africa will depend  on whether  the white,  black,  mixed-race  an~l  Indian citi-
zen.a  of this state  sur.ceed  in establishinCJ  togethe-c  n  nutional  01:der  \1hich  i.s 
free  of all discrimination,  in place  oE  the  existing syatem  conceived  ex-
elusively by white Africans.  If this  should  fail,  all  the  newly  for.med 
links between  Pretoria  and  Zambia,  Hozambique  and  il  number  of other black 
African  states will not  last  lon<J  either. 
44 .  In  the  Republic  of  South  1\ fr  ica  Uw re  has  bP.en  a  mcne~c  i ng  bui ld-np  of: 
conflict issues.  If the  long-ovenluc  i.ntern<1l  dot•,~nte  in  ~io11th  Africa  does 
not materialize,  there will probably  bf'  a  civil  W<t.t'  soon,  1·1hir:h  could  .spread 
into an  international conflict.  'l.'lw  black :najo:r:ity of the  populal:ion 
cannot  be  deprived  of  any political involvement  and  re:;ponsibili.ty  in 
and  to  the  state.  There will be  no  peace while  non-whites  are  treated  a3 
second-class  citizens.  The  policy of  'separate  development'  of the  cliffr~r-· 
ent population  groups  has  failed  to  reduce  tensions  in  South  /\Erica.  ·~,e 
policy. of d6tonte  pursued  by. the  South  i\frican  Prime  Ninister,  Hr  Vorsv~r. 
has  so  far  not  been  app~rent internally and  has  s~~ved mainly  l:o  arranqe dis-
cussions  with  hlack African  states;  it is part of  foreign  polLcy  bul:  not 
home  policy.  'l'he  South l\frican  Prime  !'iinister still :·JGems  to  be  of  the 
opinion  thilt he  can  uphold  t.he  unfortunul:e policy  o!.'  aparth,!id  Lf:  he  prornis<,!S 
economic  aid  to  the  black  African  conntrics  ~dth  '<~hom  he  is  l:ol.din<J  t:alk:J, 
lcavos  Namibia  and  convinces  the  white~  minot:i.Ly  <Ju·.:•n:nrnent  i11  rthodesi.a  t:n  al·-
low  the  blGck  rn;1 jot·.i.ty  a  sh<arc  in  pr.M<Jr. 
Africa  and  its neighl>ourinq  9tates  could  perh;,pt:>  m:1kc  t '"'  i11t.r•no:d  rn:cd'l"n's 
eanier,  but  <t  change  can  onl'j  be  br.ouqht  abr:ntt  by  intnrn;J l  n~ ro:r:m:'l.  'l'h.;t"c  ;:t 1 ·,~ 
und.oubtedly  whit-_<!!  llfri.c.:1ns  who  are  t)rClJar.ed  to  cJi.gpcnse  ·.·!i  t:h  n11e  or  oi:htn  n::;H:ct 
of  the  apartheid  policy,  hut  ther.~  t'3  still 11'.)  r.•.carJinl'S'>  i;o  <1l.Lov1  a  •y:nui<1c.: 
intqrnal balance 
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it·J  ,,f  'l'' "'  imt>ortlll"l':(•  f<,J:  (·CmlOinic  <~nr]  oth('r  rPasons,  the  widf!~'pr{_·ad  pac;sivit.y 
of  thf•  l•!·.·nt.<  ell  ~~orl.d  in  the  p<lf>L  !3')~'111;,  almost  i ncompn:-hcnRible>.  lnstc-ad  of 
bc;i.nq  ncl'ivcly  invol.vcd  in  a  settlement which  would  take  account  of 1:hc  justified 
inter.ents  of all strata of  t:he  population  of  the  South African  Hepublic,  mere 
lip service  is  paid  to  resolutions  by  the  United  Nations  and  the  Organization 
of Afr.ic  .. n  tJnity.  This  policy,  supporting  the  maximum  claims  of  one  party 
to  the  conflict,  seems  allnost  more  disastrous  than  total passivity,  since it 
could  ult-i.rn~ll:t:ly  contribute  to  the  development  of  an  atmosphere which  would 
make  a  l"~aceful  compromise  impossible.  If  Lhis  policy is continued,  all 
the  po!3si.l)ili.ties  which  are still open  to  an honest arbitrator today might 
be  c limi  nc\ ted. 
46.  Whereu.s  the  attitude of  the  OAU  member  states and  the other states of 
the  'l'rlird  1•/orlcl,  ns  well  as  the  Communist  states of Europe  and  Asia,  which 
arc  CJ)w<~ys  ready  to  cooperate  for  reasons  of opportunism,  is characterized 
by  firnnwr;s  and  solidurity,  the  UN  debates  indicate  the  vagueness  of the 
Western world's  approach.  This  is  clearly shown  by  comparing  the  speeches 
and  voting  of  the Hestern  delegates.  Whereas  the Western  countries  are  pre-
pared  in  the  Middle  East  debates  to acknowledge without  reservation  Israel's 
r.ig'l1t  to national existence,  there  is  no  such  attitude  in  favour  of the 
white  Africans  and  the  other South African minorities.  We  cannot  go  into 
details here but  there  is  no  doubt  that more  or  less all Western  states pro-
scribe Pretoria's internal policy,  like the  UN  G.eneral  Assembly,  and  fin-
ancially support  the  UN 's  information  acti-vity  on  the policy of apartheid, 
but  consistently oppose  all OAU  proposals  on military  inter~ention against 
South  Afric.1  and  on  economic  isolation of that country.  It is also  com-
plctely  i.ncomprehensihle  that  the  Western  countries,  in  order not  to  lose 
their  iilfluence  in  the  Third  World,  especially in  Black  Africa,  are  apparent-
ly s~tisfied to  support  the  OAU  proposals.  Such  attitudes will scarcely 
help  to  chanye  or  replace  the  untenable political order  in  South Africa 
since  rr0.toria  rightly sees  this as  the self-appointed  task of the white 
Africans.  Such  a  policy would  hardly bring  a  solution to the  South 1\frican 
p~oblcm any closer. 
47.  The  AmeJ:ican  secretnry of  State,  Hr  Kissinger,  announced  the  new  African 
policy  of  the  United  States  in April  in  Lusaka.  He  made  it quite  clear that 
the unitnJ states were  committed  to supporting  the  int~rests of  black Africa  -
the  entalJliflhment  of  black  majority governments  while  at the  same  time 
preflcrvin<J  minority rights  for  the  whites.  lie  has  frequently  repeated  this 
new  conc·~pt  of  American  policy  on  Africa  in  public  speeches  and  before  the 
American  con<JJ:ess.  ld.though  the  US!\  has,  legally speaking,  settled  the  racial 
is8\H!,  c(!t"tain  social  problems  remain,  and  its hands  are  th~reforc  somewhal 
tiNI;  this  rneanr;  th••t  particular  rec;ponsibi.lity  falls  upon  the  Eu·rorean 
community,  canada,  iiU!>tJ·a lia,  :rapan,  arid  other  states. 
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so  far  concerned  itself so little with  the political events in the  Republic 
of  south  Africa.  The  statement  by  the  Foreign Ministers of the Member  States 
on  23  February  1976,  which was  drawn  up  in the context of political coopera-
tion,  constitutes  a  starting point.  While  condemning  South Africa's 
apartheid policy it does not  contain  any  formula,  any  approach for easing or 
eliminating the discriminatory racial policy.  In  this connection it is 
gratifying to note  that  on  28  October  1976  Mr  Kaufmann,  Permanent  Representative 
of the Netherlands  to the  United  Nations,  rejected,  on  behalf of the  EEC, 
the fictitious status of  independence  announced  by  South Africa two  days 
earlier for  the Transkei,  the first of the  'Homelands'  for black people, 
on  the  grounds that this  step would  merely consolidate the effects of 
apartheid  in this area.  The  European  Economic  Community's  policy  towards 
south Africa has  so  far been  undistinguished.  Instead  of  giving the  policy 
on  south Africa  an  important  place in  the foreign  policy of the Community, 
the Community  has  lived  through the  drama  in  a  passive rather than active 
role.  South Africa  is certainly  a  long way  away,  but it is nevertheless 
of great political and  economic  importance to us1  One  only has to consider 
the  shipping routes  past  the coast  of  South  Africa  and  the  raw materials 
which it supplies.  It has  over  70% of the world's  gold  reserves,  75% of the 
world's chrome  reserves,  the world's largest deposits of platinum,  vanadium 
and  manganese  as well  as  large deposits of iron ore,  fluorite,  diamonds, 
uranium,  coal,  silver,  nickel,  titanium,  lead,  tin,  zinc,  copper,  magnesite 
and  phosphates.  It is therefore greatly in the  interests of the Community 
for there to be  no  disruptions to the  many  contacts with  South Africa, 
because  Europe  is a  continent which  is short  of  raw materials.  This will 
not  be  the case,  however,  if everything remains  as it is,  becausH  the present 
situation must  inevitably  lead to  a  catastrophe.  Since  the  recent  events 
in  soweto  in particular,  the political situation has become  dangerously tense. 
The  European  Community,  together with other Western  states if possible,  should 
therefore endeavour  as  speedily as possible to develop  a  strategy for  a  peace-
ful  solution that will  take  account  of the interests of all sections of the 
population.  It can  only be  hoped  that  ther.e  are still black politicians in 
South Africa who  are  prepared to play their part  in  implementing  such  a 
solution.  The  time-bomb is ticking away  inexorably  and  the  time  available 
for  achieving an  agreed  solution  seems  to have  become  very  short. 
49.  Within  the  framework  of the Lome  convention  special programmes  should 
be  prepared  and  adopted  for  ACP  countries in  Southern Africa.  They  should 
1  See  the  figures  on  the  EEC's  trade with  South Africa  in  Annex  I 
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- establishment  of  an  aid  programme, 
- improvement  of their position  as  regards  exports, 
- trade concessions  for  beef  and  veal, 
- more  intensive  industrial cooperation, 
- food  aid. 
Article  59  of the  Lome  Convention  expressly  lays  down  that exceptional 
aid  may  be  accorded  to  ACP  states  faced with  serious  economic  difficulties. 
Since  the  Mozambique  Government  imposed  sanctions  on  the  Rhodesian  regime 
in  March  1976,  following which  the  Benguela  route was  closod,  thoro  wan  " 
case  for  granting  aid  of this kind  to  Botswana,  Malawi,  7.aire  and  Zambia. 
Lesotho was  also  in  urgent  need  of aid  (this was  discussed  at  length at 
the  Joint committee meeting  in  Lome  from  1  to 4  December  1976)  as  a  result 
of the fictitious  independence of the Transkei,  the first  'Homeland'  for 
black  people,  which  has  had  the effect of cutting  some  road  links.  The 
EEC  should  also give  some  timely thought  to the question  of  how  regional 
cooperation  between  the  ACP  states in  Southern  Africa could be  organized 
when  Rhodesia  and  Namibia  have  gained their  independence.  At  the  request 
of  Botswana,  Tanzania  and  Zambia,  the Commission  intends to provide  scholar-
ships  for  Namibian  students,  and  also  proposes to assist the  UN  Institute 
for  Namibia  in Lusaka,  which  is training administrators  for  a  future 
independent  government  of  Namibia. 
2.  Ncunibill  and  HhodAs.ia 
SO.  Namibia  is another  problem to which  Europe  cannot  remain  indifferent. 
As  far back  as  1966  the  United  Nations  declared  independence  for  the  former 
territory of  South West  Africa which was  under  the mandate  of the  League 
of Nations  and  the trusteeship of  UNO;  even  today it is administered  by 
the  Union  of  South Africa  under  conditions which  the  International Court  of 
Justice  and  the United  Nations  consider  to be  illegal.  In  1971  the Inter-
national Court  of  Justice declared  that the  Member  States of the United 
Nations  should  regard  the  presence of  South Africa  in  Namibia  as  illegal. 
There  have  been major  debates  in  the  UN  about  Namibia  and  from  5  to 
8  January  1976  in  Dakar  there was  an  important conference concerned with 
human  rights  in  Namibia.  An  action  programme  was  adopted  demanding  political 
and  economic  independence  for  Namibia  and  corresponding  sanctions against 
the  Republic  of  South Africa.  In  the  case  of  Namibia,  it is important 
that it already possesses  an  internationally accepted  legal  status. 
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•JII<:'!l~.lon.  '!.'hi.:;  prob.lr!m  •.v:1:;  it.l!;o  ..:nn:,ici•~J·I"!t.l  1\tH.h•r  Lht:!  Y<IDIIIIri<~  1\s:Hlei"l:i.on. 
'.1'1\IJ!:,  at  tltn  cllnclu!li"n  ol.  Ute  me~~tin<J  of  l:h•!  I·:J·:c--l\l\~it1  -JPLIIL  Connn]ttce  on  the 
i:;lo~n<l  o[  JVI.1•H·i.tius  (23-.::~;  OctoLer  l'JFi),  a  !lpeciwl  declat·;d:ion  cnllP.ci  for 
a  :-;.i.mpli.fiecl  procedure  to  [,·tci.litute  N<:<mibia ':;;  accession  to the  Association 
1 
nfter  independence  Several written questions  have  also been  addressed  to 
.  f  h  .  .  2  ·1  ·  the  COlli1Cl.L  o:  t  c  European  Corrunl.lnttH!s  ,  t1e  ans•.vers  to 'lllnch  did  not  prove 
p:n·t: i.c:ulnr ly s.ll:lsfactory.  In  Lhe  difficultic:;;  of  political and  economic 
illt:e•Jral:i.on  of  t,;urope,  consultation between  th·~  r.tenlber  States  over  problems 
such  <IS  N<Hni!.li.n,  which  are  of  wot·ld--wide  importance,  should  not  be  forgotten. 
'l'h-:!  present  u ituation  in  Nc1mibia  is  extremely precarious  for  peace  i.n  Southern 
l\fri.:a,  and  the  Nine  must  therefore  adopt  a  joint position  on  the  Namibia 
pr.ohlem,  ul.On<J  the  lines  oE  Resolution  385  of  the  UN  Security Council,  which 
will help to  produce  a  just solution  for  this country,  with  SWAPO  involvement. 
'J'h<':  ~l:[ltcmenl:  l>y  the  ForeLgn. Minist!!Ts  on· 23  Februa~y 1976,  which  recognizes 
t.ltc  right of  Namibia  t.o  uclf-detcrminati.on and  independence,  can be seen in  this 
connccl:.i on  <HJ  a  first step in  the r:i.<jltl:  direction. 
•;/..  ~vhP.n  Llw  Pt·imc  r~ini~Jtcr of  Rhod·~~'i.a,.  ~lr  lan  Smith,  unililLP.rully  declared 
in<.l•~pen<lent.:c!  on  11  November  1965,  the  then  Br  l tish  Prime  Minister Wilson 
t:ltouqht  tl~<•t  ec,momic  ~1nncti.ons  \lloulcl  remove  the  rebel  regime  in  a  matter of 
]fl  r,l('l  l:ht•  f'COilt>llliC  n<lliCl" ionR  wbi.l'lt  I•Wrl"  illlpO~IE~d  i.n  19(>b  by  t.he 
rtt·i.l inlt  i'.rr 1 i;nn,.llt.  ~11<1  ll•o  :::ecur:ity  <'ounci l  ol  I hf•  1111iLed  Nc1l  inrn•  on  lll•nunni11, 
whi.r.h  W\'l"•"  nxtcll(lcd  b'i  UN  Rcsolu~.ion  No.  2')3  of  /.9  Hay  l9G8  into  a  full  boy--
J.  ~;nr~  Mi111tb~s  <)f  the  .To.i.nt  Committee,  CPA/CI'/311,  1.8  Dcccn•her  1974,  i\nne:<  IV,2 
/.  ----······-·--·  --- --------- -·  --· ------
:·jr'C  u.ucstions:  No.  333/'/tl  by  Hr  Glinne  on  t:he  uttitude  of  the  Hember  States 
;md  0 [  the  l·~:-:c  towacds  l:lle  international.  status  of  tJamibia, 
,_1,)  No.  Cl')  Ol  ';>.7  ,l<ll1U<lry  1975,  pu<JCS  3-4; 
tiD.  J.f.,l,/"l~i  hy  ~11:  t;li.nnr·  on  concf!rt·,,d  aC.·tion  wit·l1  re~rard  to  UN  Secur·i t.y 
Cc)t.tllcil  mc<lfnll:<~OJ  on  N.n~i.l;ia  - Q,J  No.  C80  of  '>  1\pril  l<J7C•,  payes  3-4; 
N•.'·  161/"!'i  hy  i·lJ:  Gl.i.nl'C  on  th0  appli.c<~tirlll  nf  l·h·~  •l•J'-'1"0"  of  Lit•.:!  Uni.tc'J 
Nati.ons  Conn•.:il  fo.r  N;_)lai 11i.a,  t),J  No.  CBl  of  b  l\pr.i.l  1-')·/r,,  p:•'.F-'S  1--2. 
PE  45.547/fin. J,, 1·t·s.  '!'ell  yo.•n;  l<Jt.cr  llLi.ngs~,~;:tc  ~;l.Ll.l  goiny  w"'ll  cconcllnicc1l.ly  [or 
J.j1u:t  .. 'roiu  und  even  Uw  severest critics of this  reyime  lwd  l:o  admit  that  tl•o 
be>y•.-(•1.1  l•C~•.1  prunult'd  J·iltlk  •.  L:,dn  rct.ard•2d  the  econnnd c  and  induslri al  i.nl:e1:-
11;,_1  <k--.-~:lnpmenl:  of.  the  breulc···<IWay  colony;  milny  new  jobs  ll11ve  lH'Cil  created 
"'"'1  w.illl  ;1  l:cl;Jti,·r l.y  l.o\v  r<1Lc  0f  inf]iltion  u,c  gro>':s  nill::ioni'll.  product  dnl'l•--· 
This  \~<IS  only possible,  o:!:  course;  1Jecause  l:11e 
J.>O\'ct,.:t:  waf;  hrol>c-n  by  ul.mosl  nll Wc:Jtern  states,  the  USSR  and  t.l1e  East.ern 
ecotlt)'llic  sit-uati.C•I•  hi'.is  det<"ri0rated,  if only because the whites  <1re 
b~']inrd tl':J  to  le<~ve tllP  countl:y.  In  addition,  the  liklihood  of  a  peaceful 
trur,sfrr of pov:er  t.o  the black majority hnc  vi!'tually disappeared.  With 
the fuilure of  the  Dr:iti.f>h  efforts at  the  Geneva  peac  conference at  t.he 
en~ of  JatJl'ary  1917  to  cstablioh a  basis  for  negotiations,  the final phase 
of  t.he  HhocJesinn  I raqr,rJy  may  well  have  begun,  unless  some  miracle intervenes. 
In  vic-~!  nf  l:he  22:1  rat.io  of  bJacks  to whiLes  and  the  incrcilsing  black 
yu,ori.l.lil  activity,  there is  a  growing  d<~nger that  white  supremacy  will 
col.l.RJ.X>(~  overnight  like a  house  of  cards.  In  a  situation which  seems  almost 
hopo:'lt!Rs  one  can  only support  the appeal by  the British  Foreign  Mini:o;ter, 
AnLl!ony  Crosland,  to ran  Smith  not  to slam the door  finally  on  a  peaceful 
settlement. 
53.  i\s  in  t:he  case of  Namibia,  the  community's  Foreign  Ministers  also spoke 
out  on  23  Februa~y 197G  in  favour  of  independence  for  Rhodesia  and  the 
estnbli.shment  of  a  bluck majority government.  At  the  summit  meeting  of the 
IJr;ildr,  of. Govcrnmr:nt  in  l\pri l  197(.,  the-,  Po.si.ti.on  of  the Community  have· partly 
di~n·o:~qnrclcd  th('  :;anct·ions  <l<J<li.n:;t  Rhodesia  for  years,  \:he  Conunission  oughl  to 
do  """':yt.hing  po~·.sihl.c·  to consnlt  "·ith the  }lc·rnber  States  concernecJ1 .  On  the 
otllr~r  l12.11d  it must  be  en•phc,3iz~;d that,  as  metnl)ers  of the  United  Nations,  all 
Mr:mbcr  States are obliged to  implement  the  United  Nations  sanctions  And  mea-
It should also be  paintc·d  out  in  thi1:1  cohnection that  a lthouyh the 
rnf:asurc~~  a<Joptnd  hy  the  UN  Ser:uri.ty council againot  Rhodesia  are being ap-
Off.ici;l)_  nt::.1t.i  :~Lies  sho~  ...  1Jov10ver,  tl;.-1\:  the  r·a·:c's  lr~llr' with  Hl•odr.Ria 
is  on  L1  lllltch  I110rc  mocl('St  scale than  with  south  l\fd.c<1,  Moz<~mbique and 
1\ncy:.:! a  (  ~;ee  /lnn"x  I) 
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in  Lhill:  p<n·t  of  the worlr].  'l'hernfon!  they  do  not  come  within  t:he  sr:ope 
o(  llrl.:l.c:lc  113  which  crnbodies  the principle that the  Commllnil:y  has  the 
no]~ rosponsi.hi  . .li.ty  for  the  common  commercial  policy with  respect  to  a 
2  . 
nLm-tn('l\lbcl·  stnte of  the  1-:JX:  •  7\1:  all events,  our  committee  ts of  the 
opi t1ion  l hat  the  quosl.i.on  or:  Hhode!:li.<l  must  be  contintmlly dis<!IISsed  wi.thin 
the  (r.amework  oE  poli.L.i.cal  solution will  be achieved at  the  Geneva 
conference.  'l'he  Communit.y,  for its part,  should consider  in  good  time 
how  economic  assistance can be given without  delay to an  indep_endent 
'7.irubabwe'  ruled by  a  black  m"ajority. 
2  See  in this connection Written Q11estions  Nos  526/75  and  527/75  by 
Mr  Patijn to the council and  Commission  on  the  implementation  by the 
EEC  of sanctions against  Rhodesia:  OJ  No.  C89  of  16  April  1976,  pages 
6-9. 
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1110  J-'orei9n  ~'linist:crs  of  the  Memuer  ::Jtates within  the  fril:mMurk  of  polH  .. ical 
cuopet"ilLion  1  ('l)ne~:cnU;  u  stilrling point  for  the  development  of  u  t'olllllllllliLy 
policy  in  tlli.s  spl~to.!J:P..  lt is not  clear,  however,  why  the  Conununity  merely 
J:Cf.Jf'ats  and  cndnrsP.s  the  at.til:Pdes  which  have  already been  set out  .in  the 
rc:wl.uliolw  of  tb12  Ol\lJ  <mel  Lhc  United  Nations.  'l'he  Community  mus·t  evolve 
j  ts  own  opjni.on  aJJout  pol .icy  in  Southern  Africa  so  that it is  in  a  pm-d ti.on 
to  undertake  <•11  uclive  dialogue  in  tl1is  area.  In  view  of its multiple 
reliJtions with  Uw states  of Africa  under  the  Lorn~  Convention,  the  over.all 
<~pprouch of its Mediterranean  policy and  the  incipient Euro-African  d.i<~ loque, 
th<'!  El~C  cnnnot  shun  its polit.ical responsibility  to"vlards  the  soutl1ern part 
of Africa.  As  the  super-powers,  in  the  absence  of world-wide  detente,  will 
tend  to  mark  out  their  spheres  of interest in Africa,  the  European  Conununity 
hns  an  important  role  as  a  mediator. 
'j 5.  'l'he  Conununi ty must  now  draw  concrete  conclusions  from  the  statement  of 
] 
23  February  1976  nnd  then  take  action.  It should  consider,  above  all,  com-
merci nl policy  and  tl1e  arms  sales  by  individual  Nember  States  in  this area. 
'I'l1e  Community  mu~;t be  clear about  the  question  of South Africa,  for  this  is 
one  of the  J:ichest  countries  of  the earth  ~n terms  of  raw  materials  and  is 
economically  tho  most  highly  develop~d state in Africa.  It should  work  out 
con,promise  solutions  for  South Africa  and  discuss  these with  its most  import-
ant  p;1rtners.  'J'he  Community,  with  its not  inconsiderable  economic  influence 
in  PreloJ:ia,  shouJd  m<~ke  representations  and  above  all put  forward  two  con-
crete  demanl1s:  elimination of  the discriminatory  internal policy,  i.e.  aban-
donment  of  the  policy of npartheid,  and  independence  for  Namibia,  As  the 
issues  of conflict  in  Southern  Africa have  increased menacingly  and  the pre-
:ocnt  situation must  lead  sooner or later  to disaster,  a  sense  of  urgency is 
nccuccl.  Otl1crwise  tho  Community  could  soon  be  confronted with  a  conflict 
cctd::r.i.ng  on  the  Hepublic  of South Africa,  a  potentinl nuclear  power.  'l'herc 
is  no  question  thut  the  rcl.ationship between  the  EEC  and  Southern Africo.  one 
u?Jy  vlill have  a  decisive  influence  on  the  relationship between  Europe  ilnd 
the  countries  participating in  the  Lorn~  Convention  and  the  other Afric•Jn 
States.  Certainly  the  n~1turc  of  the  Lome  Convention  is predominantly 
oconomi~ l.>ul  the~  politic<.ll  infh1encc  of  this  Euro-i\fl·ic<l11  coopcr·ntion  c<:~nnot 
he  dcn.i<~cl.  No  one  wil I  cli~JpuLc  th<tt  smooth  and  normal  economic  dcvc•lopmc!lll 
in  our  r-ontinenL  clepcnds  to  a  great  cxlcnt.  on  the  st<1tc  or  the  relaU.nnships 
bel  ween  1\ fr.i c:i1  <tncl  Etn·opc.  /\part  from  economic questions,  Lhc  pre~enc(•  of 
Cul;<In  - and,  as  t·<?cently  reported,  also Vietnamese  - troops  in,  and  tho::  supply 
0f  Srwicl  wc<~ponu to a  num·ucr  of  countries  in 1\fricn,  including  South 1\fric<J, 
l  Sec  J\1111t'X  I I 
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cxl.erndl  1nili.t:.1ry  invnlvr·:mcnL  in  i.nl•,rnill  ,\Jr-ic.:Jn  af(ilin;  i:J  al>>u  in  (·untlicl: 
with  the  J'i.nctl  oct  of  Ll1e  Contet·E,ll(·e  on  !>er;ur.i.ty  and  Cooper.Lltion  ill  E11rope 
(CSCE)  and  c,1nnot  he  rl)conciled with  the policy of _q~.t_~_l;~.! 
'l'he  nwin  difficulty  <~nd  therefore  the main  dunger  for  Burope  is  that 
differcncr:s  ~:till persist between  the  countries  of  the  Community  in  their 
hiBt:.oric'-11,  poL.iU.cal  ;:md  economic molivations.  Refer  once  must  thcr  r.' fot'c 
br:  mu.dc  once  again  to  the  often  quoted  'poll tical will,'  because  only this 
will enu.ble  the  'common  iuterest'  to be  defined  that ulti1nately  le<•.cls  to 
'Conunun.ity  <:~ction.' ~t:5"~.J~  !:~1_c:l~~i.t  _1_!  _}U2 o'l_c;_~:_i  <_t L. !: '.:'.':.! t_h  .~£;:.i,~:•.t_,__  __  f\_!_l_(J2)~  _  _ii_!:'.S1 ...  !~~':'"::'1n_!_J~~~s~ 
J.i.n  __ .'...QQ.Q__Jml\ l 
H  11.2_9  _r::.:_:_  ~~ 
1974:  EEC  imparl:s  ...............  672 
EEC  Axports  .......  · ....  4,261 
19./5'  EEC  i mporls  .  "' .........  847 
EE:c  exports  ............  4,230 
Sot~_t:,b_!!._fri:_ca 
197·1:  EEC  imports  ...............  2,318,346 
EEC  exports  ........... 3,035,371 
1975:  EEC  imports  ..... .  .. .  .  ..  ..  3,234,095 
EEC  exports  ...............  3,099,665 
Angola_ 
1974:  EEC  imports  ...............  199,888 
EEC  exports  .............  195,037 
1975:  rmc  imports  ...........  117,070 
EEC  exports  .............  107,032 
Moz<:t mb GJ.~~ 
1974:  EEC  imports  ...............  151,871 
m::c  exports  ................  145,798 
1975:  EEC  imports  ..............  120,542 
EEC  expor·t.s  ............... 
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__  <>!  __  lll_•'....JJS'.c.l_._l_l::.>_U~ado.Q.!:_(!_<L.!2YJ}l~J~o_rc  i,5.H1_~i_r;i,:,~_~c_r._~_Q_f'__~.l'2  __ Men>))e r 
~~  t,c~_t;_e~;.  l~.'.!tl  ___ pu bl  i:;h'C:_<~  .. _<1_U.!.!.S:_..2.nd  o  l....l.b.~_p_o  1 it  i_s:a l __  c_O..:_:>J2'?.!~1:..~.2.!.l....i.'l~:!..~~~·J  ..  ~1.r!. 
}_!l._ __  r,_t_\:{~'.llt!>~..£1.!.3.l  .. .fcb_":''''1ry  __  1:_J]G 
1.  'l'he  l'linintcrr;  for For•::-ign  l\ffa.irs  of  the  nine  r:ountt·i.c~'  oE  the  CollUnunity, 
wt:el:i.J~<f  i  11  Luxt~Ht)JOtl.rg  and  recalling tho  cJecisions  whi.ch  thr!y  h<:~ve  <ttloptnd 
w.i th  J:"9" n.l  to the  People':;  Hopublic  of 1\ngola,  examined  the  problem8 
"rlsin~  in  that area  of Africa. 
~.  It  is with great attention and  considerable  concern  that the  Ministers 
have  fullm-Jed  events  in Angola  which  have  resulted  in great  suffering,  loss 
of  many  human  lives and  serious  damage  to the  economy.  'I'hey call  for  the 
:ce-esl:abl.ishment  of  the  peaceful  sil:ua.tion  necessary for  the  recon:;truction 
~nd development  of Angola. 
3,  •rh•!  MiniFJters  for  Foreign Affairs  consider  that it is  for  the  Angolan 
people  to settle its  own  destiny.  In  this  connection,  they expressed 
<Jrent  reyard  for  the  efforts  made  by  the  01\.U  to  find  an African  solution  to 
the  difficulties,  and  eschewed  anything  which  might lnterfercwith  a  successful 
outcome.  'l'hey con<Jemned  all external  military intervention  an<i  exprfls<I<Jrl 
the  firm hope  that this would  soon  be  brought  to an  end.  In  the  interests 
of  Llt~  prosperity of  the  region  they hoped  that  peaceful  and  con1;t:ructive 
coopenttion  wou.ld  be  established,  premlpposing  friendly relations  b1!l·tween 
tho  African States  involved .. 
4.  ~ha Ministors  confirmed  the  basic  position of  the  Nine  Menilier  States 
of  t:hc  Community: 
- re~diness  on  the  part  of  the  Nine  to develop cooperation to  the  extent 
th~t such  relations are  desired  by African States,  and  the  rejection of 
Rny  Corm  of action by any State  aimed  at the  creation  of  a  sphere  of 
in[luence  in nfrica; 
re1:pect  f.or  the  independence  of all l\frican States and  the  ~;overeign 
ri•_rlit  of  these  States  to define  their national  policy without  foreign 
intorfuronce; 
·•  flltpport  for  01\U  measures  to  promote 1\frican coopec.ltion; 
- tlw  r.ight  Q[  tho  Rhod~sian and  Namibian  peoplen  t:o  self···clobJt'mlnation 
<tn<l  independence; 
- ccliHit,mn<:~ tion  of  lhP.  .!l£~r.tlleid  policy  of  South Africa. 
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of  the  Committee  on  External  Economic  Relations 
Draftsman:  Mr  Laban 
On  28  September  1976,  the  Committee  on External  Economic  Relations 
appointed  Mr  Laban  draftsman. 
It considered  the draft opinion at its meetings of lB  January  and 
25  January  1977  and  adopted it unanimously with three  abstentions  on 
15  February  1977. 
Present:  Mr  Kaspereit,  chairman;  Mr  Schmidt  and  Mr  Martinelli, 
vice-chairmen;  Mr  Laban,  draftsman;  Mr  Baas,  Mr  Bayerl,  Mr  Bersani, 
Mr  De  Clercq,  Mr  Didier,  Mr  Klepsch,  Mr  L'Estrange,  Mr  Molloy,  Mr  Pucci, 
Sir  Brandon  Rhys  Williams  (deputizing  for  Mr  Spicer),  Mr  Sandri, 
Mr  Thornley  and  Mr  Vandewiele. 
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complete. 
The  50  or  so already  independent  states will  soon  be  joined  by  the 
French territory of  the  Afars  and  Issas  (due  to become  independent  in  1977) 
and  Namibia  (independent  by  the  end  of  1978 at the  latest).  Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe)  seems  at last to be  moving  towards  a  government  representative  of 
the  vast  majority  of  the  population  of  that country.  Only South Africa, 
seems,  for  the  time  being at least,  to be  the  exception to this general  rule 
and still maintains  almost  intact the  legal and  economic  structures of  'white 
power'. 
2.  There  are  many  contradictions among  the  young  newly  independent  states 
(when  the Treaties  of  Rome  were  signed  in  1957,  only eight African  states 
already  enjoyed  international sovereignty). 
Not  only  is there  the traditional opposition between white Africa 
(Arabic  and  Berber  language  groups)  and  black Africa  but also the  ideological 
conflicts between  'progressive'  and  'moderate'  Africa.  The artificial nature 
of  the  boundaries  handed  down  from  the  colonial  age  and  the diversity of 
cultures  inhc;lrlterl  from  l".h~  former  colonial  powers  (United  Kingdom,  France, 
Belgium,  Portuyal,  Spain,  [taly)  have  only exacerbi'ltecJ  thetHl  dU ran:HlCEH'l  .111rl 
contributed  to  the  failure  of  any  pan-African  dream. 
3.  Since  the birth of  the  Community,  the African continent has  been  seen as 
a  geographical  area  in which,  because  of  its proximity to Europe  and  the 
special responsibilities  of  several Member  States there,  the  Community's 
development aid  could  be  most  effectively concentrated. 
So,  virtually  from  the start the  Community  created  the  basis  for  an 
African  policy,  whereas  it still does  not have,  in 1976,  comparable  policies 
for  south-east Asia  or  Latin America. 
This African bias  of  the  development  aid  policy  (finding its practical 
application in  the  European  Development  Fund  which  operates principally in 
Africa,  and  the  implementation  of  the  Yaounde  I  and  Yaounde II conventions, 
a!'l  well  as  the  l\rusha  aqreement with  Kenya,  lJganda  and  Tanzania)  was  to 
remain  unchanged  until  the  enlargement  in  1973,  in  spite  of  the  Communit.y'R 
wish,  expressed  in  1963,  to extend  the association to other developing 
countries with similar  economic  and  production structures  to the Associated 
States  (Declaration  of  Intent  of  2  April 1963). 
4.  The  accession  of  the United  Kingdom  in 1973  obliged  the  Community  to 
extend its African policy to almost all the  states of black Africa  and  to 
other  geographical areas  (the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific)  and  to consider  the 
problems  of  those  countries  of  the Indian sub-continent and  south-east Asia 
which were  members  of  the  Commonwealth. 
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overall Mediterranean policy and  opened  negotiations  to this  end  with  the 
Arab  countries  of  North Africa. 
5.  Now,  at the  end  of  1976,  most  of  the  countries  of Africa  enjoy  (or  are 
about  to enjoy)  privileged trade  relations with  the  Comnunity: 
-Algeria,  Morocco  and  Tunisia  signed,  in April  1976 -under the  Comnunity's 
Mediterranean policy  - cooperation agreements  on  which  the  European 
Parliament has  just delivered  its opinion  (see Pintat report  - Doc.  307/76); 
-On 18  January  1977  Egypt,  Syria  and  Jo~dan concluded_with  the  Community 
an  agreement similar to those between. the  Cornrnun~ty and the Maghreb 
countries: 
- The  Saharan  and  the  sub-Saharan states,  former  colonies  of France,  the 
United  Kingdom,  Belgium,  Italy and  Spain  (including the  islands  of 
Madagascar  and  Mauritius)  are signatories to the  Lorn~  Convention  and  enjoy 
the  substantial trade benefits granted  by  the  Comnunity  to the  signatory 
countries.  Guinea-Bissau  (former  Portuguese  Guinea)  is  now  also a  party 
to the  Lorn~  Convention; 
- Most  of  the territories which have  achieved  independence  since  1974 are 
preparing  in their turn to sign the  Lorn~  convention.  This  is  the  case 
for  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  sao-Tom~ and  Principe  (former  Portuguese 
possessions);  the  Cornaro  Islands  (excluding Mayotte)  and  the  Seychelles 
(former  overseas  countries  and  territories  (OCT)  for  whom  accession is 
almost automatic). 
Angola  and  Mozambique,  which  became  independent during  1975,  have  not 
yet  made  known  their decision to open negotiations with  the  Comnunity  for 
accession to  the  Lorn~  Convention.  However,  when  the  time  comes,  accession 
should  not  pose  any serious  problems. 
6.  Three  countries still have  no  privileged  links with  the  Comnunity: 
Libya,  the  Republic  of  south Africa  (including  - for  the  time  being  -
Namibia,  which is still dependent,  and  the Transkei whose  'indepedence' 
will not be  recognized  by the  Comnunity)  and  Rhodesia  (subject  to inter-
national  sanctions as  long  as  the  present white  government holds  on  to 
power). 
7.  Libya,  it is true,  (like all  the African countries  except  South-A2rica 
and  Rhodesia  and,  for  the  time being,  the  Comoro  Islands  and  the  Seychelles) 
benefits  from  the  Comnunity  scheme  of  generalized preferences which has  been 
in operation -with regular  improvements  - since  1971. 
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view  expressed at the  time  by  the  Committee  on  External  Economic  Relations 
on  the  Lorn~ Convention,  the  Community's  Mediterranean  policy,  the  agree-
ments  with  the  Maghreb  countries  or  the  Community  scheme  of  generalized 
preferences. 
We  feel it would  be  more  appropriate  to take  a  more  detached  view  of 
the various  features  of  community  policy and  ask  the  following  broader 
questions: 
is it possible  for  the  Community  to have  a  uniform trade  policy vis-a-vis 
the  countries  of Africa? 
should  not Africa's place  in the  Community's  development aid  poii."cy  be 
reconsidered? 
- is the  importance  of  the  Community's  trade  relations with  the Republic 
of  South Africa  compatible with  the  community's  policy towards  other 
African countries? 
(a)  Is it possible  for  the  Community to have  a  uniform trade  policy vis-a-vis 
the  countries  of Africa? 
9.  We  have  stressed  from  the beginning  of  this  opinion  the  importance  of 
the differences  and  discrepancies  between  the  individual states  of  the 
African continent,  which  make  themselves  felt in their relations with  each 
other  and with  the  developed  countries.  With  the  exception  of  the  Republic 
of  South Africa,  (although  in this country the  statistics must  be  inter-
preted  in the light of  the great differences in  incomes  between  the white 
population and  the  others)  Africa does  have  one  common  denominator:  under-
development.  It should also be  stressed  that this  too is very unevenly 
spread:  what  does  Gabon,  with  a  low  population and  substantial energy 
resources  have  in  common  with  Rwanda  or Upper  Volta,  both  landlocked,  both 
lacking  resources,  and  both densely  populated? 
10.  It would  seem that,  for  the  purposes  of  its African policy,  the  Community 
has decided to keep to the traditional I division between Arabic  or  Berber-speaking 
Africa to the  north  of  the  Sahara  and  black Africa  to the  south.  (Mauritania 
and  the  Sudan,  members  of  the Arab  League  and  straddling the  demarcation 
line between white  and  black Africa were  signatories to the  Lorn~  Convention). 
In effect,  according  to the  reasons  given by commissioner  Cheysson,  the 
Maghreb  and  Egypt  (included  in the  negotiations with  the  Mashrek  countries) 
constitute  a  kind  of  intermediate area between  Europe  and  the  more  under-
developed area  of  black Africa. 
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one.  The  problems  of  Egypt differ little from  those  of  the  Sudan which 
shares  many  characteristics  - through  a  common  historical heritage  - with 
its neighbour  to the  north.  Moreover,  in  many  respects,  the  under-development 
of  Egypt  (40  million inhabitants,  75%  illiterate,  usable  surface  area  of  the 
size  of  Belgium)  is  much  more  chronic  than  that  of  many  countries  of  black 
Africa. 
12.  The  trade  concessions  granted  by the  Community  to the African countries 
(except as  we  have  seen  Libya,  the  Republic  of  South Africa  plus  Namibia, 
and  Rhodesia)  are  indeed  substantial.  A  brief analysis  of  the  content of 
the  agreements  with  the  Maghreb  countries  and  the  Convention  of  Lorn~ 
demonstrates  this: 
- the  three agreements with Algeria,  Morocco  and  Tunisia  provide  for  free 
access  to the  Community  market  for  all non-agricultural  products  (apart 
from  two  excE)ptions  which will disappear  by  the  end  of  1979).  Agricultural 
concessions  cover  between  80  and  90%  of  agricultural exports  from  these 
three  countries  ancl  vary  between  20'/.,  and  100'}(,  of  the  CC1'.  [n  return,  Lhe 
community  receives  no  reciprocal benefits  for  its  own  exports  (on  these 
points  see Pintat report,  Doc.  307/76,  points  22  to 32). 
Egypt will enjoy similar advantages when negotiations with  the  community 
are  complete. 
- The  first title of  the  Lome  Convention  on  trade  cooperation mentions  the 
need  to  provide additional  advantages  for  the  ACP  States'  trade. 
For  this  purpose  products  originating  in  the  ACP  enter  the  Community 
free  of  customs  duties  and  of  charges having  equivalent effect and  without 
quantitative restrictions  (apart  from certain limitations  on  certain agricul-
tural  products  subject  to  the  organization of  the  market  under  the  common 
Agricultural Policy). 
According  to  figures  provided  in  Miss  Flesch's report  on  the  Lorn~ 
Convention  (Doc.  283/75,  point  15)  99.2% of  the  overall value  of  imports 
originating in the  ACP  will be  given  free  access.  In addition,  the  Convention 
provides  (chapter  2)  for  EEC  finance  for  improving  the ACP  States'  foreign 
trade  structures. 
In  return  for  these  considerable benefits,  the  community  receives  no 
guarantee  of preferential treatment  for  its exports. 
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agreements  we  have  just mentioned,  the  Community  grants,  to almost all 
African countries,  as  we  have  seen,  the benefits  of  the  Community  system  of 
generalized  preferences,  the  importance  of which has  recently been stressed 
by  the  committee  on  External  Economic  Relations  (see  Couste  opinion  on  the 
l.'J77  system,  PE  45.616/fin.). 
14.  The  Community  cannot offer the African  countries  any  more  benefits 
in  the  framework  of  a  trade  policy because  these  countries  already  enjoy 
free  access  to  the Community  market.  Further aid  to  eligible African 
countries would  therefore have  to  be  granted under  the development  and 
cooperation  policy. 
The  Community has  agreed  to  take  part  in efforts to  formulate  a  new 
world  economic  order,  the  shape  of which  is still being  discussed  in the 
North-South  Dialogue.  In  any  case,  this  re-structuring  should  transcend  the 
purely Euro-African  framework  and  cover all the  relations between  developed 
and  developing  countries.  The  machinery  introduced by  the  Community  to give 
n  new  dimension  to its relations with developing  countries already goes  well 
beyond  the  bounds  of  trade  policy  in  the strict sense  (financial  cooperation, 
guaranteed  export earnings,  special advantages  to the  poorest  countries). 
(b)  Should  not Africa's  place  in the  Community's  development  aid policy be 
reconsidered? 
15.  In  1976,  Africa  continues  to be  by  far  the  major  beneficiary of  the 
aid which  the  Community gives  to developing  countries.  It is true that a 
number  of  Caribbean and  Pacific countries are also signatories to the  Lome 
Convention.  However,  their total population is very small  (less  than  5 
million inhabitants  in the  9  non-African signatories  to the  Lome  Convention, 
excluding  Surinam and  Papua-New  Guinea  which have  not  yet officially 
acceded). 
Naturally,  we  are  not  forgetting  the aid which  the  Community grants to 
certain non-African Mediterranean countries  (Portugal,  Turkey,  Greece, 
Cyprus,  Malta).  And  of  course  the Community  system of generalized preferences 
was  set up  to a  certain extent to counterbalance  the  concentration of 
Community  aid  on Africa.  Nevertheless,  its remains  true  - and  contacts with 
representatives  of  Latin America,  South-East Asia  and  the  Indian sub-
continent bear this  out  - that the  Community's  development aid  policy is 
directed almost entirely towards  Africa. 
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(at  the  time  of  the  signing of the Treaty of  Rome,  the overseas  territories 
of  the Six were  situated almost  entirely in Africa)  and  by  the  closeness of 
the  economic  links  between  the newly  independent states  and  their  former 
colonial  powers  throughout  the  sixties  and  early seventies,  is it defens.ible·? 
Without going over  the traditional  argument  (never  settled)  between  the 
supporters  of regionalism  (concentrating aid on  a  given  area)  and  globalism 
(spreading development  aid over all the developing  countries) ,  we  feel  that 
it would be  desirable,  at a  time when  the global nature of  economic  problems 
is  an  accepted fact,  to  envisage  a  better balance in  the spread of Community 
development  aid.  Latin-America,  South  East Asia  and  the  Indian  sub-
continent are all areas  open  to  European  influence.  In  many  parts of these 
countries  underdevelopment  is  even  more  critical than  in most  of the African 
countries  and  population  problems  even  more  dramatic.  All  these  facts  should be 
taken  into  consideration  and,  in our  view,  justify more  balanced  action  by 
the  Community.  This  does  not,  however,  mean  that trade policy as  regards 
Africa should  in  any way  be  changed  for  the worse. 
17.  Thus,  the  Community  cannot  afford to neglect  the African  continent 
in  the  future.  The  serious  nature of the political problems  arising there 
in  recent months,  particularly in  Southern Africa  preclude  such  a  policy. 
Moreover,  the  Community  is directly involved  in  the  Rhodesian  conflict. 
Any  loss of  influence by  Europe would be  matched  by  the  intervention of 
other  foreign  powers  in  the  continent,  as  events  in Angola  following 
Portuguese decolonization have  demonstrated. 
18.  Nevertheless,  we  feel  that in  the last analysis  the  Community has 
everything  to  gain  from greater balance  in  its development  aid  policy.  In 
particular,  it should  intensify its trade relations with  under-developed 
areas  outside of Africa,  without  damaging  the  extremely  close trade relations 
existing with that  continent.  In  this  context  maximum  priority should be 
given  to  the  poorest  countries  in  the matter of  trade  concess·ions  and 
financial  and  food  aid. 
(c)  Is  the  importance  of  the  Community's  trade relations with  the  Republic  of 
south Africa  compatible with  the  Community's  policy towards  other African 
countries? 
19.  Whether  we  like it or  not,  the  Republic  of  South Africa is the  economic 
giant  of  the African continent.  With  6%  of  the  total population of Africa 
it accounts  for  more  than half  of  its electricity production and  consumption, 
a  third  of its total gross  national  products,  more  than  a  fifth of  its 
agricultural production,  approximately  30%  of  its exports and  25%  of its 
imports. 
South  ~frica's richness  in raw  materials  and  precious  minerals  are  very 
attractive  to  the  Co~nunity countries who  lack  these. 
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result of  dra<natic  falls  in  gold prices  - has  been. experiencing serious 
economic  problems,  further  aggravated  by  the  grow.ing  resistance of the  black 
population  to  the discriminatory apartheid  policy of  t.he  white minority 
government. 
Nevertheless  this  country  remains  by  fa:c  i~he  Community's  best African 
customer.  The  Federal  Republic of Germany  (19'/o  of  South Africa's  imports) 
and  the United  Kingdom  are  in  first and  second  place  respectively as  suppliers 
to  the Republic of  South Africa.  Italy and  France  are  in  fifth  and  sixth 
positions  (behind  the United States  and  cTapan).  The  recent  conclusion  of  a 
cont:ract  between  France  and  Soutl• Africa  for  the  const.ruction  of  two  nuclear 
power  stations  in  l:!wt  co·tnt.ry  (for  ~1h1Ch  s?vet·al  o·theJ:  Conununity  countries 
were  bidding)  demonstrates  tho  interest  ~nd compntition  aroused  by  the 
richness  Cln<l  tl1e  potent_la1  of  t:he  Soutll  Af::cl·~a~;  n;ar·ket  .. 
the Community's  po.iicy  towi1rds  cC•UI•trie8  nc.rl':  o[ tile  Limpopo  and ':lith  its 
support  f:or  black  n;::l:ionalist.  moveme:1ts  in  i"2lnt<i.Jii;  (Soe~th  West  Africa)  and 
Z imbnbwe  (Hllodc)sia)  '? 
In  other  1n 1Drds,.  can  the  Conununity,  t.;jth·.HJt  be)_n~  self··cont.radictory 
carry  on  ~~~- genernes  a i.e:  pol.L1.;y  tovJ2Lr(:~s  b'L-:..c·\  __  -._  f1:  t:-·::. ..  ,,~~.ile  developing 
rel.:~i~in:;:~;  ~dil-l~  ;-i(~\J.~·_;-,  Af,~·j_(:'d.  ~.,.f\t(JSE·  i:·\t-:c:·naJ  }Y~l·i(~~?  :1  s  h<lS(~:d  on  diametrically 
opposi.;:~E::  principle':-:  ~rr.r.tintena.;Jce  of  ~:be  sD~·q-e;~~a::;y  of  th~::-:  \~hitr~  minority, 
apart1"10id.  an(i  dc-.....~o.:..;:)proe-r:..t  n'f  'B:.:t:ttustan£; J) 
22,.,  It 14Culd  sE:~-.::::r::  .i~!  this  p-art.icuL·.:.r  Ci)S:~.  c(·-::l:r.J.i.'':/  :;..;l  :_h,:;:  opJ.nion  expressed 
by  cerLa.in  count.:cie~3  ..  l.-:lat__  ;-_·;:c1cc  -~s  ]n:.;;er.~al·r;Dl,.~  i/'CJ;t,  polit·tcs. 
T:·:(!  Conununity  ~~J~ive.s  no  p·L·t~f0;·:c:nLi.·.;.)  ~).t'3  tc·  t:~~P  :~<-:public  of  South Africa, 
merely  ma.i.nta.in.i.tlCJ  ni.n:tnrl1  dS.plomilt.·c,:  rc;":;,;ne:.  B:::-",ri.  i.'l  m.i.nd  t:he  fact  that, 
under  incrt:!i1:~:i.nc~  pressurC>  :~Ynrn  l".~H~  C.:::\'(~1.-:.Jpin::;  c:~~un!~Tl(·.::;,.  lhc:  i..inited  States  and 
va1:j.OllS  European  cClunlries,  m~}jor1 \:y  \""'!Ov-:.:-r:~:'>:o:,t:;  \,:J  ~ 1 .  .:.n  ~he  yeurs  ahead, 
.indet::d  "in  the  mont.h~-i  ahec;(;,  ~nev.i ~--"lJly  ..:.~;,n:l·.··  '~:>  .n\•1\:J.  jn  ))~awib.iaJ  Zimbabwe  and 
.influence  to have  introclu::-.:ed  .Ln  Sollt-.h  A£1:·! c~'  n 
:s  cc0~nmi~ and  political 
uf ·:;overnment  based  on 
~:t:r"  Comrllcll'lity  itself and 
It  doc's  not  tal<;e  a  prophPL  tu  ~cce  UtciL  1::  liH'  110t."t:oo-distant  future 
South Africa will  become  completPly  isolat2d  ana  if it  ts  not  itself 
forced  t:o  put.  an  enrl  t:o  apart"t1eir:.l  .::tnd  i·)y  d-·'ll'~-- ~-.-;~:It- p1:()1_:(~sses  involve  the 
" ..  : [  ~  !.>e!  engulfed  in 
PE  4::;,547/fin. the white populations  impossible.  Such  a  conflict  in which  foreign  powers 
flitch  as  the Soviet Union  and  China would  become  involved  might  lead to  a 
world war.  There  is  so  far little evtdance  that  tl1fl  South  /\fri c·rm  govern 
ment  is  prepared  to  contribute itself to  a  peaceful  solution of  the 
country's  internal  problems.  The  EEC  has  adopted  an  extremely  passive 
attitude towards  the situation.  It is  therefore  very desirable  that measures 
should  be  adopted  if possible  in  conjunction with  other Western  countries 
to  provide  the necessary basis  for  the solution of these problems.  Lack 
of action might well  in  the near  future  jeopardize cooperation with  the 
countries of  the Third World  (including the Arab  nations) . 
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